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MONTHLY REVIEW

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AFTER THE FALL

THE EDITORS

CAMBODIA BETWEEN PEKING AND PARIS

KEITH BUCHANAN

The Chilean Election

ADOLFO GILLY

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

The response to Adolfo Gilly's *Inside the Cuban Revolution,* which was the October issue of MR and has also been published separately as a cloth-bound book, has been extraordinarily enthusiastic. A typical letter states: "The October issue is a remarkable document which is having a stirring influence upon my radical friends. It is an outstanding contribution to the theoretical clarity of the entire socialist movement, and you deserve special praise for publishing it." Fortunately, we anticipated an unusually heavy demand and printed extra copies of the magazine as well as a considerable edition of the book. We can therefore fill all orders for either version. Prices: magazine—$1; book—$2.50.

Through an oversight on the part of the translator, a phrase was omitted from a statement by Fidel Castro quoted on page 58 of Adolfo Gilly's *Inside the Cuban Revolution.* There Fidel is quoted as saying that Cuba was not defeated "while there remains one man, woman, or child in this land." What he actually said was, "while there remains one man, woman, or child capable of bearing arms in this land."

We are proud to announce that on January 27th MR Press will publish the American edition of *Consciencism,* the latest book by Kwame Nkrumah who, in addition to being the President of Ghana, is one of free

(*continued on inside back cover*)

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AFTER THE FALL

October and early November have been a good period for the world socialist movement, though, as always happens in such periods, not all developments have been positive. We propose to review the major events, reserving the change of leadership in the Soviet Union for last and most detailed consideration.

The Cairo Conference

Early in October a Conference of 47 "nonaligned" nations was held in Cairo. A *New York Times* story, summing up the results after it was all over, carried the headline: "Cairo Outcome Viewed as Sign of Nonalignment's Drift to Left." (October 13.) President Nkrumah of Ghana seems to have expressed the dominant sentiment of the Conference when he said:

> There is such a thing as peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, but as long as oppressive classes exist, there can be no such thing as peaceful coexistence of opposing ideologies. We cannot coexist with imperialism, we cannot coexist with colonialism, we cannot coexist with neocolonialism. There can be no coexistence between poverty and plenty, between the developing countries and the forces that militate against their progress and development. (Quoted by Wilfred Burchett in the *National Guardian,* October 24.)

This militant anti-imperialism, clearly spelled out in the final declaration, marks the Cairo Conference as a continuer of Bandung rather than of Belgrade (where the last Conference of nonaligned countries was held in 1961). At Belgrade, under the aegis of Nehru and Tito, the chief emphasis was on the generalities of world peace and disarmament. At Cairo, the initiative passed into the hands of men like Nkrumah, Ben Bella, and Sukarno who were less concerned with generalities and more with defeating imperialism, the enemy not only of their own development but of world peace and disarmament as well.

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Though the Chinese were not present at Cairo, the outcome of the Conference was a victory for their view of the world situation and of the crucial role of the underdeveloped countries of the capitalist world in the struggle against imperialism. By the same token it was a defeat for the Soviet version of peaceful coexistence, which subordinates the anti-imperialist role of the underdeveloped countries to that of the socialist countries and the working-class movements in the advanced capitalist countries. After Cairo there could no longer be any question of the moral ascendancy of Peking over Moscow in the underdeveloped world. And this fact, it seems reasonable to suppose, may have had more than a little to do with the timing of the fall from power of the main architect of the Soviet defeat.

The British Election

It is of course nonsense to believe that the Labor government is going to lead Britain into socialism. The Labor Party is not really a socialist party at all but a party of capitalist reform with a socialist left wing. And in any case no serious steps toward socialism are conceivable in a country which bases its global policy on imperialist exploitation, alignment with the United States, and participation in the American-dominated network of counter-revolutionary military alliances. Nevertheless, the Labor Party does have a left wing which is bound to exercise some influence on governmental policy and which now has an opportunity to increase its strength both in the party and in the country.

Immediately, we should expect from the new government some greater willingness than the Tories have shown to pursue British national interests (still capitalist interests, of course) and to cross Washington in the process. For example, Labor is likely to support actively Peking's admission to the UN and may follow up by trying to help the United States get out of the almost unbelievable mess which an insane Southeast Asia policy has created. Already, Labor has moved to implement its campaign pledge to renationalize steel. This is not by itself a step toward socialism–lots of capitalist countries have nationalized part or all of their steel industries (and much else besides)—but every

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expansion of the nationalized sector can only be welcomed by socialists as facilitating the task of transition later on. In addition, there is some reason to hope that Labor may adopt a more enlightened colonial policy than the Tories in areas as far flung as British Guiana, Malaysia, southern Arabia, and Cyprus—though here pressures from British Big Business and from Washington will be tremendous and perhaps overwhelming for a government which is prevented by its basic commitments from even threatening to pursue a genuinely independent course.

The Chinese A-Bomb

The Chinese possession of a nuclear potential does not increase the danger of nuclear war. Quite the contrary. The Chinese have solemnly pledged never to be the first to use nuclear weapons—something which the United States has adamantly refused to do—and their revolutionary record of devotion to the cause of socialism and progress entitles them to full trust and confidence. But the fact that they can, or soon will be able to, retaliate if attacked should make the atom warriors in Washington more cautious. Washington knows that it is a dangerous business to practice atomic blackmail against the Soviet Union; the sooner they know it with respect to the other great socialist power the better.

But this is not the only, or perhaps even the greatest, significance of the Chinese achievement. The mastering of nuclear technology by an Asian country but recently one of the world's most backward, with a minimum of assistance from more advanced countries and under conditions of extraordinary difficulty, will inevitably give a great psychological and political lift to the peoples still under the yoke of imperialism. If the Chinese can overthrow their erstwhile imperialist masters and then catch up with them in science and technology, then so can all the others who are faced with the same problems and challenges. What is needed is to cast off the fearful and servile mentality of the past, to stand up and struggle, to build socialism and have confidence that nothing is impossible for a country which knows how to tap the inexhaustible creative energy of its own people.

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By a dramatic symbolic act, China has once again proclaimed these revolutionary truths before the whole world.

The American Election

If Goldwater had won, the American election would of course have portended ominous changes in both domestic and foreign policies. Since he didn't, what we have to expect is "more of the same"—which is bad enough.

The only surprising thing about the election was the record size of Johnson's majority. This shows convincingly that neither the ruling class nor the American people as a whole are in any mood for fascist experiments. On the other hand, it is still too early to make any confident judgments about what this lopsided Democratic victory means for the future of United States politics. The Goldwaterites will certainly not retire without a struggle, but it now seems unlikely that they will be able to hold onto control of the Republican Party. American parties are political cartels, serving essentially the same class interests, which are kept together by a common interest in feeding at the public trough. A leadership which has failed as spectacularly as the present Republican leadership to serve this end is more than likely to be jettisoned before it can do more damage. Moreover, if the Republican Party reverts to normal, there is little reason to think that the Democrats will be able to retain anything like the majority achieved on November 3rd. All the talk we have been hearing recently about how Johnson has been working overtime to turn the Democratic Party into the vehicle of some supra-political national consensus, while true enough, is hardly the profound political insight it is often presented as. Throughout the present century, this consensus has existed as a fact, expressing itself through two parties differing only slightly in social composition and ideology. The Goldwaterites attempted to change the character of one of these parties, and by so doing offered the Democrats a golden opportunity to offer themselves as the legitimate bearer of both party traditions. Johnson's overwhelming victory shows that, as far as the 1964 election was concerned, they scored a remarkable success. But it certainly does not prove that the Democratic Party can continue as a single consensus party if and when the Republicans resume their

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normal role. And it must be added that all the pressures and the long-established mechanics of political competition for the enormous spoils of office in this country favor the two-party rather than the one-party arrangement.

When we say that, looking ahead, we must expect "more of the same," we naturally do not mean that there will literally be no changes in American policies. The American government long since lost the initiative both at home and abroad and is now pretty much limited to reacting to forces over which it has no control. This reactive behavior will necessitate policy changes from time to time as insoluble problems and crises develop. Such a situation is already at hand in South Vietnam, and a change in United States policy cannot be long delayed. Whether it will be along the lines of a "return to Geneva" or an utterly hopeless and self-defeating "flight forward" into war against South Vietnam's neighbors is still uncertain. But whichever course is followed will certainly have far-reaching consequences in other areas of the world, which in turn will require new United States adaptations. What we cannot expect from a Johnson administration, any more than we could have expected it from a Goldwater administration, is any change in the profoundly counter-revolutionary aims of the country's global policy.

The ever hopeful liberals are once again, as after Truman's election in 1948 and Kennedy's in 1960, expecting big changes in domestic policies—"an epoch of legislative innovation at home rivalling the New Deal period" is the way Karl Meyer put it in his report from Washington to the *New Statesman* on the eve of the election (October 30). It is little likely. The New Deal was the result of a shattering economic crisis which terrified the American ruling class. No such crisis exists now, and the big corporations have never had it so good. Under these circumstances the mechanism of organized paralysis which Americans whimsically call a system of government can be counted on to do its work with normal efficiency. The only thing besides a severe economic crisis which could generate a new New Deal in this country would be the emergence of a politically meaningful Left—not one confining its program to New Deal type measures but one capable of shifting the whole political spectrum leftward. Such developments, unfortunately, are not now in sight.

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The Fall of Khrushchev

The fall of Khrushchev is a "good thing," as Chou En-lai told newsmen from the Philippines visiting China. The reason is not, however, that the new leadership is in any essential way different from Khrushchev. Brezhnev and Kosygin—Mikoyan and Suslov should perhaps also be included in the top team—come from the same stratum of political functionaries and economic managers which has proliferated in the last four decades of rapid economic growth.* In the Stalin era these people were kept on a tight rein and obliged to execute Stalin's policies by strict secret police controls. With the virtual liquidation of these controls after Stalin's death, this group has become freer and is now a sort of autonomous self-renewing elite, formally quite similar to the leadership of America's giant corporations. (This does not mean, of course, that the two elites have the same interests or pursue the same policies: they exist in radically different institutional structures and have entirely different histories.) This group enjoys a monopoly of power and a range of privileges which set it apart from the mass of the Soviet people by a virtually unbridgeable social abyss. In the Soviet context it is conservative, interested in maintaining the domestic status quo (which of course includes rapid economic growth and rising living standards) and international peace and tranquility. The appropriate ideology for such a group stresses peaceful coexistence and competition with capitalism. Coexistence is supposed to guarantee against war, and competition to ensure a painless transition to socialism on a global scale as the people of one country after another gradually become aware of the superiority of the Soviet system. It is quite clear that in enunci-

*We deliberately refrain from using the ambiguous and loaded term "bureaucrat." The popular conception of a bureaucrat is some middle or petty official wound up in red tape and unable to make any decisions on his own. Such types of course abound in the Soviet Union, as they do in all other societies which have reached a certain level of development, but the Soviet leadership has never been drawn from their ranks. The leaders are men who, through exceptional ability, energy, initiative, shrewdness, have made their way up either in politics or industry (sometimes moving back and forth from one to the other). It is no more appropriate to call them bureaucrats than it would be to call, say, the president of General Motors a bureaucrat.

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ating this ideology and basing his policies on it, K was faithfully representing the group, not following some personal line of his own.

Why then has K now been unceremoniously dumped, without so much as a thank-you, and replaced by a team which he himself helped to promote to top positions and which represents the same stratum of Soviet society and has basically the same ideas as K himself?

The reason, it seems clear, is that K's policies were failing. The United States has repeatedly—in Germany, Cuba, South Vietnam, Formosa—rejected any brand of peaceful coexistence except its own. All K's attempts to get Washington to be more "reasonable," for example by threats over Berlin or by concessions as in the agreement to exempt underground explosions from the test ban treaty, only made K look ridiculous or the Soviet Union weak. Recent indications that he was prepared to go farther—perhaps much farther—along this slippery road probably had a lot to do with the timing of his ouster. His son-in-law's personal diplomacy in West Germany, followed by the announcement that K himself would soon visit Bonn, raised the specter of a sell-out of East Germany; and Moscow's silence in the face of American bombings of North Vietnam after the August events in the Gulf of Tonkin suggested that K was ready to concede the United States a free hand in Southeast Asia. It seems plausible to assume that these incidents were read as urgent danger signals by the Soviet military as well as by allied members of the socialist bloc, and these repercussions must in turn have had their impact inside the Presidium and the Central Committee.*

But it was not only vis-à-vis the capitalist West that K's

*An insight into what has been going on behind the scenes is provided in an article entitled "No Tears for Adzhubei" by Seymour Freidin in the *Herald Tribune* of October 31st. After reporting on the Khrushchev-Adzhubei flirtation with Bonn, Freidin adds: "The Chinese Communists, either through information or deft ability to read signs of distress, quickly sent a message of support to Ulbricht. It was one sign of enthusiasm from Mao Tse-tung that no other Communist Party in Europe held up to scorn. Actually, many of the comrades on the continent said quite openly that the Red Chinese were not only right in this case but much more pragmatic than was K."

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policies were in trouble. The theory of legal and/or peaceful transition to socialism took a bad beating in Brazil in April and another of a different kind in Chile in September. (See Adolfo Gilly's article on the Chilean election on page 493.) The underdeveloped countries, bossed around and squeezed by imperialism, have been showing fewer and fewer signs of waiting for salvation until that still far-off day when the Soviet economy should catch up with and surpass the advanced capitalist countries. This was reflected in the leftward swing at Cairo, and perhaps still more in the remarkably rapid decline in the political influence and moral authority of the Soviet-oriented Communist Parties throughout the underdeveloped world. And, as we noted above, while the position of the Soviet Union in the underdeveloped countries was declining, that of China was rising. Writing less than a year ago, Isaac Deutscher predicted that "the fact that Red China is broadcasting to the world the watchwords of revolutionary internationalism, as no one has broadcast them for a very long time, is bound to have deep, wide, positive, and dramatic repercussions in years and decades to come."* It now seems that it would have been more appropriate to say "in the weeks and months to come."

K's reactions to the decline in Soviet prestige in the underdeveloped world were both inept and panicky. On the one hand he showered even more favors on the bourgeois governments of Egypt and India, both busily suppressing their own Communists. The main effect seems to have been to increase discontent among the socialist countries which could have made much better use of Soviet aid. On the other hand, he tried to crack the whip over the non-Soviet Communist Parties, stirring fears of a return to Stalinist methods and evoking opposition even among those which were ideologically allied with him against the Chinese. In this connection it seems reasonable to suppose that the polite but stinging rebuke contained in the "testament" of Togliatti, by far the most prestigious of the Western Communist leaders, must have done much to undermine K's position inside as well as outside the Soviet Union.

To all these failures in the international arena must be

*"Maoism—Its Origins, Background, and Outlook," *The Socialist Register, 1964,* p. 35, Monthly Review Press, 1964.

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added serious domestic economic problems and difficulties. It might seem exaggerated to speak of failure here—this year's harvest has been good, and the rate of growth of industrial production, at 7½ percent, is still impressive—but it is nevertheless true that, apart from the accident of a good harvest, there have been no striking successes for several years and that the Soviet economy lacks any real drive or sense of direction such as characterized the epoch of the Five Year Plans. Given the expectations which past achievements had aroused, and which K himself did his best to feed, this certainly did spell failure for the policies with which K's name was associated.

Against this background of foreign and domestic failure, K's personal weaknesses and idiosyncrasies—his propensity to make snap decisions without consulting his colleagues, his erratic style, his demagogic cultivation of personal popularity—stood out more and more glaringly and doubtless smoothed the way for his opponents in the leadership to agree on the necessity to get rid of him.

So much for the reasons for K's fall. What about the manner of it and the problems facing his successors? These questions are more closely linked than might appear on the surface.

That a change in leadership was decided behind closed doors and without anyone outside the highest party circles having any idea of what was going on, was of course in accordance with standard Soviet practice. The same sort of thing happened when Beria was thrown out, when K replaced Malenkov, and when K defeated the attempt of the so-called anti-party group to oust him. K's opponents were thus operating within the established norms of Soviet political life and probably expected their actions to be accepted at home and abroad with no more than the usual amount of (largely hypocritical) jeering from the scribes and pundits of imperialism. They must therefore have been genuinely surprised and disconcerted by the sharp reaction of questioning and even disapproval which K's fall evoked in the Communist movement of Europe (both East and West). Partly this was undoubtedly due to the fact that K was really popular with large numbers of non-Soviet Communists, but it had much deeper roots than that. These were clearly indicated in Togliatti's testament:

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It is not correct to refer to the socialist countries (including the Soviet Union) as if everything were always going well in them. This is the mistake, for instance, in that section of the 1960 Declaration dealing with these countries. In fact there continually arise in all the socialist countries difficulties, contradictions, and new problems that must be presented in their effective reality. The worst is to give the impression that everything is always going well, while suddenly we find ourselves faced with the necessity of referring to difficult situations and of explaining them. . . . Some situations appear hard to understand. In many cases one has the impression that there are differences of opinion among the leading groups, but one does not understand if this is really so and what the differences are. Perhaps it would be useful in some cases for the socialist countries also to conduct open debates on current problems in which the leaders also take part. Certainly this would contribute to a growth in the authority and prestige of the socialist regime itself. . . .

The problem which claims greater attention, one affecting as much the Soviet Union as the other socialist countries, however, is today, specially, that of overcoming the regime of restrictions and suppression of democratic and personal freedom introduced by Stalin. Not all the socialist countries present the same picture. The general impression is that of a slowness and resistance in returning to the Leninist norms that ensured, within the Party and outside of it, a wide liberty of expression and debate on culture, art, and also on politics. This slowness and resistance is for us difficult to explain, above all in consideration of the present conditions when there is no longer capitalist encirclement and economic construction has had tremendous successes. We always start from the idea that socialism is the regime in which there is the widest freedom for the workers, that they in fact participate in an organized manner in the direction of the entire social life. Therefore we greet all positions of principle and all facts showing us that this is the reality in all the socialist countries and not only in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, events that sometimes disclose the contrary to us damage the entire movement.*

Here Togliatti was obviously not expressing merely his personal preferences or even those of the Italian CP leadership. He was telling the Soviet leaders that the state of affairs in the USSR—the absence of open discussion and debate, the continu-

*"Memorandum of Comrade Togliatti on Questions of the International Working Class Movement and Its Unity," *Foreign Bulletin,* published periodically by the Foreign Section of the Central Committee of the I.C.P., n. d., pp. 13-15.

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ance of restrictions on workers' freedom, the failure to develop democratic institutions and procedures—is becoming an increasingly severe political handicap to the entire international Communist movement. The masses, including many Communists, do not see any necessity for such things in the Soviet Union today; and to the extent that they appear to be inherent in the system, the political appeal of Communism must necessarily suffer.

Since this holds not only for Italy but for other European countries as well, we can understand the immediate impact of K's fall on the European CP's. Here was a dramatic illustration of all the things Togliatti was talking about. At issue was not the fate of a particular leader but the very nature of the socialist system itself.

We focus attention on non-Soviet Communist reactions to the manner of K's fall only because we know something about them. It would obviously be even more to the point to analyze reactions within the Soviet Union itself, but on this subject we have no information whatever. The absence of such information is indeed an important aspect of the whole situation: the Soviet people have no channels through which to express themselves. This fact, however, should not lead to the assumption that they have no thoughts and feelings about the events like the fall of K.

For one thing, if Alexander Werth's impressions gathered on a trip to the Soviet Union last summer are reliable, there are unlikely to have been many tears shed over K's downfall. "The working class," Werth wrote in *The Nation* of November 2nd, "openly attacked Khrushchev as a 'windbag,' and his optimistic forecasts over the years about a steep rise in agricultural production, in the standard of living, and in general prosperity were being quoted against him. An industrial executive in Moscow went so far as to tell me in August: 'You have no idea how our workers *hate* Khrushchev.' " But whatever their feelings about K the man and the political leader, we would guess that the Soviet masses, and particularly the workers who ever since the October Revolution have been the politically most conscious segment of the Soviet population, must have reacted in very much the same way as workers all over Europe—with a sense of

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concern and dissatisfaction over their own lack of knowledge about the issues and their inability to play any part in deciding the outcome. If this is right, we may be sure that pressure from below, even though diffuse and inarticulate, will be one of the key variables which will determine the course pursued by the new leadership. And the continued existence of such pressure will constitute a standing opportunity for these leaders, or some rivals in the relatively near future, to seek to secure and fortify their power by initiating genuinely democratic reforms.

It is of course much too early to say anything very useful about the policies of the Brezhnev-Kosygin team. Their first acts have been exactly what one would expect: assurances to the world of continued attachment to peaceful coexistence, cessation of attacks on China and invitation to the Chinese to send a high-level delegation to the celebration of the anniversary of the October Revolution, and solicitous efforts to answer the questions and assuage the doubts of foreign CP's (Gomulka has announced that he is satisfied, while the Italians, who have a rather different kind of public opinion to face, have let it be known that they are not). All these are evidently mere holding operations, designed to give the new leaders time to survey the situation and plot their course.

In one little publicized measure, however, the new leaders have already taken a first step toward what could well become a fundamental transformation of the Soviet economy. According to a story in *Business Week* (October 31), they have announced that henceforth about one third of the firms in the shoe and garment industries will be guided by the market rather than by the plan in deciding what to produce, in what quantities, and at what prices to sell their output. The headlines over the *Business Week* story summarize: "Why Russia Downgrades Planners: Economists of 'Liberal' School Lead Swing Toward Marketplace and Profit Motive as Regulators of Production; Idea Will Get Tryout as Means of Ending Snarl in Consumer Goods." This is evidently a move in the direction of the Yugoslav system. That it is by no means the result of some sudden change in thinking at the top of the Soviet hierarchy seems clear: an economists' debate has been going on for several years focused on the role of prices and profits; when K was in

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Yugoslavia in the summer of 1963 he showed himself to be very receptive to his hosts' economic theories; and according to the *Business Week* account two garment factories have been experimentally operating on the new system since last spring. The present step has thus been in preparation for some time; the significance of its timing is that it seems to indicate a set determination on the part of the new leadership to press along the road of economic reform which leads away from comprehensive planning and toward reliance on the market.

Readers of MONTHLY REVIEW know from our discussion of the Yugoslav system ("Peaceful Transition from Socialism to Capitalism?" in the issue of March 1964) that we consider this road to be beset with the gravest dangers to the very survival of socialism. We cannot therefore view this move of the new Soviet leaders with anything but alarm and foreboding. And we consider it all the more deplorable in that it comes at a time when, in our view, the development of input-output and programming theories (both in the Soviet Union and abroad), and of the electronic computers needed to make their application practicable, should be giving rise to entirely new and different kinds of experimentation in economic planning. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that there is a stern inner logic to this "march to the market." No system of planning, no matter how perfectly conceived and applied, contains within itself the incentives for the human beings involved to perform their appointed roles faithfully and efficiently. They must be coerced into doing so—which no socialist has ever believed in except as a temporary necessity for survival—or they must *want* to do their part, either because they believe they are engaged in a great collective endeavor which is worthy of their best efforts, or because if they do their jobs well they will improve their private material conditions. Soviet history has known all these types of incentives, including coercion, but it is clear that during the first four stormy decades neither material incentives nor coercion can explain the historic achievements of the Soviet Union in economic construction and defense against foreign aggression. Only the passionate devotion of the Soviet workers to the ideals and promise of the Revolution kept the whole enterprise not only

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alive but able to overcome the most difficult challenges and crises.

In recent years, however, all that earlier enthusiasm and elan have been subsiding, and no compensating system of heightened material incentives has been put in its place. Though this began before K came to power, it has been most marked in the period of his rule. K. S. Karol, writing in the *New Statesman* of October 23rd, went directly to the heart of the matter:

> Under him . . . Russia became increasingly apolitical and skeptical about the future. This public mood has proved a great source of weakness. In a collective society, where the profit motive is absent and the stimulus to individual cupidity feeble, only political purpose can supply the driving force to individual effort and so make society dynamic. And political purpose in turn depends upon the public clash and interplay of ideas.

Neither K nor, so far at any rate, his successors have dared to take the lid off and let the Soviet workers reclaim the Revolution and shape it to their own desires. The only alternative is to devise a system of material incentives which will focus their attention inward on their private concerns and once again restore the profit motive and rekindle the stimulus of private cupidity. One can only hope—and as of now it is certainly no more than a hope—that in the period of confusion and struggle which probably lies ahead in the Soviet Union, the individuals and factions contending for power will be led to appeal for support and ultimately for legitimation to the people, and that in the process the tremendous economic potential of popular participation in the governing process will be rediscovered. If that should happen, new and now undreamed-of vistas would open up for the world's first socialist country.

But for the present, attention is bound to be centered on Soviet foreign policy, and especially on relations between the Soviet Union and China, the area of K's most spectacular failures. What is at issue here is not whether the two will forget their differences and, in the manner of a Hollywood movie, live happily ever after. The differences are rooted in a massive historical reality and are certain to persist for many years to come. As we pointed out a year and a half ago, when the true depth of the split was just becoming apparent, two Communist

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Internationals, in fact if not in form, have come into being, the one comprising the Soviet Union, the socialist countries of Europe, and the Communist Parties of the advanced capitalist countries; the other, China, the non-European socialist countries, and the revolutionary movements of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The real question now is not whether the two Internationals will merge but whether they will learn to cooperate against their common enemy and to their mutual advantage, agreeing to disagree where differences are too great to be composed. Writing in the May 1963 issue of MR, we emphasized: "It will take extraordinarily wise and cool leadership on both sides to prevent what is still only a dispute from degenerating into a mutually damaging and potentially disastrous fight. Whether such leadership exists or will be forthcoming, time alone will tell."

Time has now given us part of the answer: Nikita Khrushchev proved incapable of providing such leadership. It still remains to be seen whether his successors will be able to do better.

(November 6, 1964)

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CAMBODIA BETWEEN PEKING AND PARIS

BY KEITH BUCHANAN

On the 16th of September, 1964, the Cambodian press unearthed "a U.S. plot to assassinate Prince Sihanouk, disrupt the country from within, and attack at the same time from without by forces from South Vietnam and Thailand." The news is not surprising, for something like the same gambit was played by the CIA in 1958, at a time when the Prince was being received by President Eisenhower in the White House. What is surprising is that the boys in the CIA's $46-million hideaway in Langley, Virginia, show such little originality in their fumbling. This deadly and dogged persistence in error has, indeed, been the major factor in the accelerating erosion of "Anglo-Saxon" influence in the Indo-Chinese lands; as one Soviet diplomat is reported to have commented to the Cambodian Head of State, the Americans are helping the socialist camp "much better than the best Marxist propagandists." It is this disastrous and continuing combination of American mistakes and British ineptitude which has made the term "Anglo-Saxon" one of the worst pejorative epithets in the contemporary Cambodian press.

From this Western plotting and scheming, however, two things do emerge: first, the critical importance of Prince Sihanouk himself because Cambodian policy, both internal and external, bears the unmistakable imprint of his remarkable and utterly dedicated personality; second, the degrading role played by the governments of Thailand and South Vietnam as mercenaries whose services are paid for by the United States and who are being used to maintain continuous pressure on Cambodia's frontiers. One may add as a third element the so-

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Keith Buchanan, Professor of Geography in the University of Wellington, New Zealand, and editor of the journal *Pacific Viewpoint*, has recently returned from a month's visit to Cambodia. This was his third visit in three years.

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called "Khmers Serei" ("Free" Khmers) who are playing somewhat the same role in the Cambodian situation as the motley collection of Cuban renegades in Miami are playing in the Caribbean situation. In the opinion of most Cambodians the Khmers Serei are supported and financed by the CIA, if not by more reputable branches of the United States government.

The "Playboy" and the Western World

Prince Sihanouk's policy can be understood only in the light of American incomprehension of the Southeast Asian situation. American policy has been obsessed with the maintenance of an anti-Communist barrier across the Indo-Chinese lands. The maintenance of the line, "laboriously raised across Indochina" (to quote the *New York Times*), depended on the integration of Cambodia into this anti-Communist bloc, and this integration was to be achieved by American aid. That this aid, and especially the military aid, was accorded in such a fashion that it became an insult to the dignity of a proud and ancient people was something the United States never understood; for Cambodians, "the moment of truth" came in 1958 when they were told that they were *under no circumstances* to use their American-supplied equipment against the South Vietnamese forces who had occupied part of the Cambodian province of Stung Treng—the arms were supplied solely to be used against some hypothetical Communist attack. "For the first time," says Sihanouk, "America, 'champion of liberty,' appeared to me as cynically and terribly Machiavellian." His decision ultimately to cut United States military aid dates from this moment, for it became clear that "this aid was destined only to serve, in a Machiavellian fashion, the anti-Communist policies and strategies of the United States, policies and strategies in which the peace, the future, the very fate of the Khmer people meant absolutely nothing."*[1]

The American reaction to Cambodia's polite refusal late last year to accept further aid was sharp and revealing. Neutrality, it seemed, was still "immoral." According to the *Washington Post,* "the Pentagon made a strong demand for direct

*Footnotes will be found at the end of the article.

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intervention in Cambodia to overthrow the neutrality which Norodom Sihanouk dreamed about." (One might add that neutrality was no dream of the Prince's but a very real achievement.) The *New York Times* commented that with the Prince's decision Cambodia took a long step towards "the Chi-com orbit." The policy makers in the Pentagon and the woods of Virginia, in Bangkok and Saigon, did everything possible to make this prediction a reality by continuing support of the Khmers Serei, by continuing incursions across the Cambodian frontier (in at least one of these episodes American "advisers" were involved), and by the spraying of toxic chemicals which, in August this year, killed over one hundred people in the eastern border districts of Cambodia. But possibly the most insulting of these pressures was the claim advanced by the neutralist and right-wing cliques in Laos (who have shown an almost pathetic incapacity to govern Laos within its existing frontiers) to adjoining districts of northern Cambodia.

The reaction of the Cambodian Head of State was typical —and not quite what the "political commentators" and "informed observers" in the Anglo-Saxon world predicted. He certainly edged closer to China and, indeed, visited Peking for the October First celebrations. He certainly got a renewal of earlier Chinese promises to safeguard the territorial integrity of Cambodia. But before that, in June of this year, he paid a state visit to France and, in the course of conversations with General de Gaulle and his ministers, laid the basis for a new, much closer, pattern of Franco-Cambodian collaboration in all fields. He paid tribute to the "equilibrating" role of France—"it is thanks to France that Cambodia has not toppled over into the socialist camp"—and underlined in the warmest terms the significance of France's role in relation to the underdeveloped countries of the Third World. "We are happy," he said on arriving at Orly Airport, "that France has re-found her vocation as a protector of oppressed and threatened nations and peoples, that in the Third World the only Western voice which clearly defends our aspirations for justice, for peace, and for progress should be a French voice."[2]

For thirteen years the Prince, who is dismissed by many American news magazines as "a playboy," "a saxophone play-

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er," whom, as he himself said in an address at the University of Paris, the American press treats "as a fool, an eccentric, and an unbalanced person,"[3] for thirteen long years the Prince has astutely played off one great power against another, has balanced aid from the East against aid from the West. And in every twist and turn of his foreign policy, in every shrewd and carefully timed reappraisal of the road to be followed, he has never once deviated from his goal—and that goal is the defense of Cambodia's frontiers and the strengthening of Cambodia's independence. And, as Sihanouk explained so lucidly to a French journalist, this foreign policy, with its desperate concern for Cambodia's neutrality, "is not an end in itself, a means of shining, a means of making heard the voice of little Cambodia or of myself. It is the means of assuring peace for my people to allow them to develop removed from any conflict." It is a sad and bitter truth that this survival, this achievement of stability in an area still, after a quarter of a century, being ravaged by war and civil war, should have had to be accomplished in the teeth of "Anglo-Saxon" opposition; and it is salutary to reflect that today it depends on the protection and good will of People's China (against whose "aggressive" intentions Cambodia was once armed by the Americans) and of France (the sanity and realism of whose Asian policies demonstrated once and for all the reality behind the SEATO facade). Here, in the heart of Southeast Asia, Anglo-Saxon diplomacy has indeed reaped a bitter harvest.

The Pathological Effects of American Aid

To understand fully the motives behind the rejection of American aid we must set the action in its historical perspective, and scrutinize the pathological effects of this aid on Cambodian life.

Up to 1953, Cambodia, under Sihanouk's leadership, was engaged in a long struggle for political independence. From 1953 to 1963 the country was engaged in consolidating its position after its victory over colonialism. Then in 1963 "a new page in our struggle for national independence was irrevocably turned . . . from now on we intend to repulse neo-colonialism of every kind, even if it should be French."[4] Spontaneous and

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unconditional aid from friendly countries remains acceptable; so, too, in the military field is aid in the form of armament and equipment. But financial aid which would transform the Royal Cambodian Army into a force of paid mercenaries like the South Vietnamese Army is firmly rejected. In the future, Cambodia would *ask* for aid only under one set of circumstances—if she were to be attacked; "in this last case only would we allow ourselves to seek the military assistance of People's China."

American aid was clearly regarded by the Cambodians as a form of neo-colonialism; in the words of Phlek Chhat, Director General of Planning, it was "conditional, poorly adapted to our needs, and gave rise to large-scale commercial speculation."[5] Prince Sihanouk himself, while recognizing what it had achieved in certain fields, dissected its weaknesses more fully.

The first and most obvious criticism was that the aid, both military and economic, was conditional and thus unpredictable. Its aim was not to build up the Cambodian economy but to deflect Cambodia from any tendency to lean towards the socialist camp; the military aid particularly took the form of equipment which could be used only against a hypothetical enemy and not against the Thais or Vietnamese who were actually encroaching on Cambodian territory; the modernization of the army was possible only to the extent acceptable to the governments of Saigon and Bangkok. Aid on such terms was humiliating, and the Cambodians ate the bitter bread of humiliation no longer than was absolutely necessary.

The second criticism was that the inflow of dollars was causing a cumulative corruption in Cambodian national life. The pattern of this corruption, as the Head of State observed, took shape as far back as 1955 when American funds provided a large proportion of Cambodia's foreign exchange. Massive imports of luxury goods, large-scale speculation, large-scale bribery in the import-export and construction sectors of the economy, incessant intrigues and accusations of favoritism—all these flourished in the genial climate provided by the inflow of dollars.[6] And, while the government might try and wipe out corruption in those sectors it controlled, its achievements were useless as long as that part of its income represented by aid funds was effectively outside its control.

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The third criticism—and this is a particularly weighty one in a nation striving to gain control of its economic destiny—was that the aid was an instrument of American economic policy, that it represented, in effect, a means of American neo-colonialist penetration. It aimed, as Prince Sihanouk put it, "at the creation, consolidation, and development of capitalist enterprises and, eventually, of a capitalist economy in the midst of a sovereign and foreign country without taking the slightest account of the nation's legitimate rulers nor of the well understood interests of the nation."[7] It could not be used to build up the critically important state industrial sector; it could be used only by private entrepreneurs and in the strengthening of the private enterprise sector of the economy. Such a development threatened to create within Cambodian society a privileged client group whose economic well-being was dependent on foreign aid and who, when their existence as a class was involved, could be expected to be more sensitive to the wishes of the power dispensing the aid than to the interests of their own people. The Third World contains sufficient glaring examples of the dangers of this development for Cambodians to be acutely conscious of it. One of the most striking impressions I brought back from my second visit to Cambodia in 1962 was that of the swift emergence of this economically dependent client group. It need hardly be stressed that the increasing affluence of this small group was diametrically opposed to the avowed economic policy of "Khmer socialism"—that of bringing about "a less sharp and less unjust separation between the classes."

The fourth criticism levelled against American aid was that it was fundamentally dishonest. If the aid came from genuinely distinterested motives, from an honest desire to contribute to Cambodia's development, would the United States support, or allow its puppets to support, the Khmers Serei in their attacks against the Cambodian Head of State? If the aid were genuine, would the continual press campaign aimed at belittling the Cambodian achievement, aimed at humiliating the Head of State and, through him, the whole Cambodian people, be necessary? There can be little astonishment if Cambodians found themselves posing the question: "How can we, under

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such conditions, continue to receive American aid and at the same time preserve our national pride?"

There were thus very solid reasons for the Cambodian rejection of United States aid; the explanation that the move was just another example of Prince Sihanouk's unpredictability, even of petulance, is just too crass and oversimplified to merit serious consideration. The move was completely consistent with his avowed policy of achieving for Cambodia real economic independence and of strengthening the country's position as a neutral, nonaligned nation. The economic changes which were announced almost contemporaneously—the nationalization of the country's foreign trade and banking system—were moves in the same direction, designed to eliminate the "colonial" character of the Cambodian economy and above all to curb the growing power of the middleman-group, to make possible a more rational import program (without which national planning and real economic independence are impossible), and to encourage the shift of capital from commerce to productive industry.[8] These changes are a logical development of the policies advocated by the Prince for at least a decade; indeed Phlek Chhat can claim that the Cambodian example demonstrates how "countries which have been the victims of colonialism can rapidly achieve substantial results with very simple principles of action provided these principles are applied with an unflinching vigour."[9] The "simple principles of action" he refers to are the concepts on which the Popular Socialist Community is based and which were largely formulated by Prince Sihanouk himself. It is only in the light of these concepts that we can appreciate the logic and the coherence of the Prince's internal and external policies.

Pentagon and Peking

Cambodia, it is said, has no secret service, no MI5, no CIA; and it might be said with truth that there are few secrets in Cambodia. In Phnom Penh your own travel plans become everyone's property; an officially arranged visit is announced to you by the *cyclo-pousses* outside the hotel before you open the letter confirming the visit. On state matters the Prince's habit of taking the people into his closest confidence

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may alarm some of his more cautious ministers, but it is a major factor in the achievement of absolute trust and solidarity between the Head of State and the Cambodian populace. It was therefore with some measure of incredulity that I heard an Anglo-Saxon journalist complain about the difficulties of getting any picture of what was happening in Cambodia. The Prince speaks with utter frankness, with an almost calculated indiscretion; his speeches and his policy statements are widely disseminated by a most effective Information Service in monthly or weekly magazines or special reports which, even here in New Zealand, arrive for the asking.

Anglo-Saxon politicians and publicists thus profess to be utterly confused over the question of where Cambodia stands in relation to the Pentagon or to Peking. The easiest way out of this confusion seems to be to label the Prince as "pro-Communist" and his policies as policies of a Machiavellian cunning contrived solely to confuse the simple and benevolent boys toiling in Saigon, in Bangkok, or in the Pentagon. The reality is that his statements on his attitudes to the United States, to People's China, or to France have been quite explicit and crystal-clear.

On the question of relations with the United States:

> The reason why we are opposing the United States is based on this fact: since 1955 the United States has tried various means, with singular obstinacy, including the most treacherous and dangerous, to force us to join their side as a meek satellite. This is why we have carried on fierce resistance and spoken not very politely. . . . My resentment against the Americans is not because I am pro-Communist, but on the contrary is because the United States insists on continuing a war [it is] destined to lose and because by seeking to destroy the neutral countries they are unconsciously becoming the best agents of Communism in Indo-China. If Cambodia in the near future becomes surrounded by "red" nations, without any doubt this is made possible by the Americans.[10]

The quotes could be multiplied—but the theme is a constant one: the Americans are their own worst enemies; their follies and short-sightedness are making the advance of Communism inevitable; they are thus making impossible the one solution which offers some semblance of stability to the war-

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torn Indo-Chinese lands—the creation of a genuinely neutral bloc.

Sihanouk's attitude to Peking is equally clear. The relations between Cambodia and People's China are warm and friendly. Cambodians have not forgotten the role of China in preserving the country's territorial integrity; they are grateful for the unconditional aid China has given in the creation of an important state industrial sector and for the advice given by visiting Chinese technical missions. The Chinese People's Republic dominates the contemporary Asian scene—in the words of General de Gaulle, "On this continent there can be no peace, nor any war imaginable without Chinese being involved."[11] It would be quite unrealistic not to recognize this. But the recognition of this reality by Cambodia and the maintenance of the closest of ties with her great neighbor to the north do not reduce the country to satellite status. This has never been an objective of Chinese policy and, in any case, Sihanouk has made it abundantly clear that attempts of "satellitization," from whatever quarter they might come, would be met by the bitter opposition of the entire Cambodian nation. In a recent interview with J. Lacouture of *Le Monde,* he gave a typically picturesque and vigorous explanation of his attitudes to Peking: "As you know, when Callas comes on the stage all the others seem more or less supernumeraries. China is the Callas of Asia and we recognize that. But I'm not one of those who, at the end of the show, go and help Callas take off her shoes and cook her dinner. I go home for my dinner and enjoy my own cooking with my wife and my children."[12] Behind the picturesque imagery the attitudes are clear and uncompromising, and the Chinese government has shown realism and understanding in accepting these attitudes without any reservations.

These are the realities of the present. Looking to the future, a future in which neutrality may no longer be possible, in which, because of the folly and ineptitude of American policy, the whole region is "lost to Communism," Sihanouk's vision is equally clear: "If there should come a day when our region is submerged by Communism, then we hope sincerely that it should be China, and not any other socialist power, which will

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take charge of our country, *for we know that China understands us and will preserve in every way our territorial integrity.*"[13]

Last Chance in the Indo-Chinese Lands

In his speeches and in the press interviews he gave while in France, the Cambodian Head of State lucidly dissected the major elements in the Indo-Chinese situation. These are the elements which must be taken into account in any policy decisions in the area: First, a war-torn South Vietnam, four fifths of which is under effective Viet Cong control, whose people are weary of a war which has lasted a quarter of a century and which only the Americans are prolonging, whose people are tired of the long line of civilian and military dictatorships imposed on them by the United States since 1955. Second, a strong socialist state in North Vietnam, a state which, according to Sihanouk, is not interested in imposing a solution on the South and which thinks that re-unification of North and South is unlikely in less than fifteen years. Third, a Laos where the pressure of Western-backed rightist elements has created a condition of chronic instability. Fourth, a Thailand whose involvement with the United States is regarded as an ephemeral phenomenon and whose left-wing leaders such as Pridi are in exile in Peking, waiting for the fruit to ripen and fall into their lap. Fifth, for Cambodia, a situation in which constant pressure by the American-paid mercenary armies of her neighbors diverts attention and funds from the critical problems of social and economic development. Lastly, an America obsessively preoccupied with the imagined threat of Chinese expansion southwards.

To the problems thus posed there is, in Prince Sihanouk's view (a view shared by General de Gaulle), one solution and one solution only—and with each month that passes the possibility of this solution diminishes. The solution is a reconvening of the 14-nation Geneva Conference and the guaranteed and strictly supervised neutralization of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. This would create a buffer zone between the Communist bloc and the West, in a region where their confrontation is dangerous both for them and the Indo-Chinese nations.

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It would involve the complete disengagement of the Americans from South Vietnam and Laos and a simultaneous and parallel disengagement of the Communists in the same areas. It would call for a formal guarantee of the neutrality of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam by both East and West. It would, if achieved, satisfy the desperate need of people in these countries for independence, democracy, and true freedom. Whether this solution is in fact feasible depends largely on the American policy makers, above all, on their realization that this *is* their last chance. Here Sihanouk has few illusions: such a realization, and an awareness of the mistakes they have made and the injustices they have committed, may well come, he admits, only after "a diplomatic or military Dien Bien Phu." That the whole of Southeast Asia will eventually shift sharply to the Left cannot be doubted—the process is going on, even in Cambodia itself. Whether this means "communization" is less clear. What, however, is abundantly clear is that the shift is too deeply rooted in the social and political conditions of the region to be arrested by even the most massive and sophisticated barbarism, that sprayed poisons and rockets and torture and all the refinements of "special warfare" in the long run merely accelerate this shift and increase its extremist component.

Sihanouk and the Future of the Indo-Chinese Lands

The delicate equilibrium in which Cambodia is poised between East and West, between Paris and Peking, is perhaps merely a temporary stage, a "holding action" until the possibilities of achieving a complete neutralization of the Indo-Chinese lands are exhausted. Should this neutralization be in fact achieved, Cambodia's excellent relations with China and France will give an extra stability to the situation. Should, however, American (and perhaps British) opposition prove a major obstacle to the creation of a genuinely neutral bloc, the solid support of Paris and Peking will provide conditions in which Cambodian neutrality, even the consolidation of this neutrality, will be possible. The situation will certainly not remain static and it may well be, as the Prince has hinted, that a North Vietnamese guarantee of Cambodia's integrity will have to be

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sought. Be that as it may, the very survival of the Cambodian state and the possibilities of continuing survival are a major tribute to Sihanouk's infinite patience, his selfless dedication, and his diplomatic skill.

The Prince is modest enough about his achievements—he describes himself as "one who is self-taught, one who for twenty-three years has practised politics without ever having learned the 'science' "—but it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of his role, in Cambodia itself, in a wider Southeast Asian context, in the councils of the assembled non-aligned nations. It is fortunate for Cambodia, and for Southeast Asia, that his position as Head of State rests on such a diversity of qualities: his ability to maintain unity within Cambodia by an extraordinary skill in balancing Right against Left, the traditional against the new; the charisma which is his as the descendant of the Khmer kings of old and which is of major importance in a peasant society; his eloquence and the personal charm and warmth which inspire a remarkable devotion amongst those with whom he comes into contact; the popularity of his person and his policies among groups as widely separated as the Khmer villager (who is benefiting from an imaginative social and educational policy) and the urban Chinese (whose businesses benefit from a political stability and toleration rare in Southeast Asia). There are, moreover, no alternative centers of power of any significance; the army is completely loyal, and in any case the lack of any major supporting groups in the population rules out the possibility of a military coup; the Buddhist clergy, in contrast to South Vietnam, are largely unconcerned with politics.

Under these conditions the personality and the passionate humanity of Norodom Sihanouk will, like the personality and humanism of Sihanouk's illustrious ancestor Jayavarman VII, be powerful forces shaping the future of Cambodia and of the Indo-Chinese lands as a whole. It would help us immeasurably in our understanding of Southeast Asian realities if we were to attempt to get beyond the slick and sensational assessments of his personality purveyed by our popular press and to meet the real Sihanouk who emerges unmistakably from every speech,

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from every interview, from every audience in the remotest villages of the country to which he has dedicated his life.

1. Freely translated from *Le rejet de l'aide américaine,* three articles by Prince Sihanouk, reprinted by the Ministry of Information, Phnom Penh, 1964.
2. Freely translated from *Le Monde,* June 25, 1964.
3. Speech at the University of Paris, reprinted in *Global Digest,* Hong Kong, Volume 1, Number 12, pp. 141-149.
4. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, *Le rejet de l'aide américaine,* p. 21.
5. Phlek Chhat, *La conquête de l'indépendance économique du Cambodge,* Ministry of Information, Phnom Penh, 1964, p. 10.
6. Thus the cost of the Khmer-American Friendship Road, from Phnom Penh to the main port of Sihanoukville, was exactly twice what it should have been; half the money disappeared in private pockets. Han Suyin, "Why Cambodia Rejected Aid" in *Eastern Horizon,* Hong Kong, February 1964, p. 12.
7. *Le rejet de l'aide américaine,* p. 30.
8. For a lucid account of the Cambodian situation see the article by W. E. Willmott in *New Left Review,* London, May-June 1964, pp. 33-38.
9. *La conquête de l'indépendance économique du Cambodge,* p. 12.
10. Speech at the University of Paris.
11. Translation given in *Asian Almanac,* Singapore, January 26-February 1, 1964, p. 363.
12. Freely translated from *Le Monde,* June 24, 1964.
13. Speech at the University of Paris.

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THE CHILEAN ELECTION

BY ADOLFO GILLY

"It was much more difficult to take power in Russia in 1917 than it would have been in Chile in 1964. Lenin had to face a domestic and international situation that was far less favorable than the one FRAP (*Frente de Acción Popular*) had to cope with. But, had he wanted to take power by means of elections organized by the February Provisional Government; had he won the support of certain army officers in order to assuage the fears of the bourgeoisie; had he declared publicly that he would not expropriate banks or church property—in order to discourage intervention by the English, French, Americans, and Germans; had he, instead of presenting his April Theses, curbed strikes and demonstrations by the workers of Petrograd, in the name of moderation and prudence, then there would have been no Soviet Union, and the course of history would have been different. Not only was there no Lenin in Chile, but, where Lenin's party was resolved to take power, FRAP was resolved to enter the government."

Thus, not without bitterness and irony, a Chilean leftist militant summed up to me his opinion of Chile in 1964. Whatever the context or degree of profundity, most analyses of the election—especially by members of the two large FRAP parties, the Socialist and the Communist—follow this pattern of thinking.

Its echoes have reached the Central Committee of the Communist Party. At a meeting convened late in September to assess election results, Orlando Millas, a deputy and one of the most outspoken enemies of the Chinese and the so-called "extremists," said that "undoubtedly the presidential campaign

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Adolfo Gilly is the author of MR's special October issue "Inside the Cuban Revolution." He spent the summer in Chile studying the campaign which culminated in the presidential election of September 4th. The translation is by Bobbye Ortiz.

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was conducted from a clearly defensive position. This was shown by the importance given to winning over sectors of the bourgeoisie, rather than broadening influence among the proletariat and other popular sectors."

Volodia Teitelboim, a Deputy in Parliament and member of the Political Commission of the Central Committee of the CP, in answering Millas said:

> We have often heard it said that the Communist Party, because of its electoral policy, has put a brake on the struggles of the masses, on their attempts to redress grievances, and on expressions of solidarity with Cuba. This is false, since our weaknesses in these areas predate the election campaign. It is also said that we have lost strength in the working class and that, in exchange, we have won over the petty bourgeoisie. This, too, is false. The immense majority of the million votes for FRAP were workers' votes. It has been said that we must turn to violent methods, Cuban style. This, too, is wrong. Such advocacy is based on mechanical thinking vis-à-vis the Cuban experience.

The fact is that Chile in 1964 experienced an unmistakable revolutionary situation. We need not rely on the 1917 Russian analogy because there is another more recent one: Italy, 1948.

In the widely publicized Italian elections of April 18, 1948, Christian Democracy, presenting the alternative: "Communism or Democracy," defeated the Communist-Socialist front. In spite of the immense following of the two parties, the front's campaign had been fought on defensive grounds. "Conditions weren't ripe. We must wait. The elections showed that we are not the majority, since we didn't win 40 percent of the votes," said many of the leaders of the Italian Left.

In June 1948 a student attempted to assassinate Togliatti, and the masses rose up in insurrection throughout the country; in the north they occupied telephone exchanges, factories, and public buildings; in "Red Emilia" they took over entire cities.* "Police officers in Bologna and Leghorn phoned our Party's regional committees, putting themselves at our disposal," I was told by a militant Italian Communist who, like many others,

*Emilia includes the provinces of Bologna, Perrara, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and Ravenna.

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persisted in thinking that "the time had come." But Togliatti's belief in electoral methods of action was not a pretense, as the extreme Right claimed, but was indeed sincere. "He called for withdrawal from the occupied factories and public buildings; he asked for respect for electoral results and a return to calm; above all, no adventures."

The arms that the majority of the partisans had refused to give up at the war's end were taken out of their hiding places in June 1948; and it is a fact that the possession of arms provides a certain structure and attitude, a firmness to thought and collective response. In Chile the Socialist-Communist front had neither arms nor plans to acquire them, but it did have a more favorable international situation. Furthermore, the masses that constituted its followers had set up throughout the country a network of organizations much more far-reaching than the trade unions or the workers' parties, which embraced virtually the entire exploited population: the twenty thousand *allendista* committees [pro Allende, FRAP's presidential candidate].

The Allendista Committees

The *allendista* committees sprang up in consequence of an unmistakably revolutionary situation. Ostensibly organized for the electoral campaign, their adherents extended this function; at their meetings not only electoral questions were analyzed and discussed, but also other problems and preoccupations: strikes, methods of social struggle, international problems, measures to be taken by the next government. If it is characteristic of revolutions to arise out of a situation—whether embryonic or evolved—where a duality of power exists, the *allendista* committees tended to be an early expression of this duality: the masses, excluded from state power, looked upon the committees as their own centers of organization, deliberation, discussion, and collective decision. This interpretation of the role of the committees filtered through to the FRAP leadership. In the final stages of the campaign one leader after another declared against disbanding the committees after the expected election victory, pointing out that they could be transformed into official government assemblages for the defense of popular power.

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(*continued from page* 495)

Faced, on the one hand, with the presence of twenty thousand active, flourishing committees, ready to take their place as part of the government after September fifth and, on the other hand, with verbal assurances from FRAP leaders that their regime would not be socialist, it was hardly surprising that the Right should give more weight to the fact of the committees' existence than to the words of the leadership, whose sincerity concerned them little. The Right has, after all, learned something about the internal dynamics of revolutions!

But a duality existed within the committees themselves. The rank and file—especially in workers' districts—tended to invest them with an activist, militant content, whereas the official leadership made every effort to keep them on the straight and narrow electoral path. The attitude of the leadership was the outgrowth of a tactical approach that expressed itself in "we mustn't provoke the Right," and "we mustn't provide pretexts for a coup d'état."

The committees oscillated between the two policies, and the election came too soon for them to resolve their contradictions. An electoral victory would have resolved them successfully, and the committees would have gone on to play a key role in the new regime. Every committee, after extensive discussion, reached the decision to unite, after the FRAP victory they expected, in defense of the new government and for the immediate implementation of FRAP's program of expropriation of *latifundios* and imperialist-owned properties. In such discussions there was invariably one key word, stated or implied: "arms." This fact, together with several others that were favorable to the Left, brought Chile even closer to the Italy of 1948.

During the electoral campaign this internal duality was manifest. The FRAP masses mobilized to win the election, and they fully expected to win it; but they also mobilized for action on other levels. They were—and this is a fact of prime importance—prepared to continue such actions after victory. However, the official strategy of the FRAP leadership was based on acceptance of the election results as conclusive, trimming the organization to constitutional size, and making a "legal

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revolution." The rank and file saw the elections as a point of departure, beyond which they would continue to advance by other methods; the leadership saw them as the ultimate goal.

The Right exploited this contradiction to the fullest. It also carried on a steady terrorist campaign. But to attribute FRAP's defeat to the "campaign of fear" is an absurd rationalization. The opposing front, made up of Conservatives and Liberals allied with Christian Democrats, divided among themselves the task of defending the continuity of the Chilean capitalist regime. Conservatives and Liberals together with certain acknowledged agents of imperialism carried on a basically anti-Communist, terrorist campaign. Christian Democracy, having left this task to its allies, presented itself as the standard-bearer of "revolution with liberty." It spoke of the necessity for profound changes to be effected without the accompanying horrors that their allies attributed to Communists and Socialists.

It was not the FRAP masses who were thrown off balance by the opposition's campaign, but its leadership, which succumbed completely to the blackmail of the Right, reinforced as it was by the constant threat of a coup that would annul the elections. This threat implied, in effect, that if FRAP were to mobilize its forces along revolutionary lines, the elections would be halted by violence. The Right was given all manner of guarantees, in order not to "provoke" a coup—and not only verbal guarantees, which convince no one. FRAP leadership proved by its acts that it would not resort, and it would prevent the rank and file from resorting, to revolutionary action during the election campaign. There is indeed a solid base to the current charges that the leaders discouraged and prevented strikes; permitted control of the streets by the Right to go unchallenged; curbed all forms of militant action; allowed the diplomatic break with Cuba to occur without effective protest; and abandoned all traditional methods of class struggle—methods which their supporters could have utilized to great advantage. Such was the proof given, not merely in words but in deeds, that the goal was exclusively electoral.

It must be pointed out that this was not an improvised strategy, nor was it merely the result of retreat under enemy pressure. On the contrary, it was the conscious, deliberate re-

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suit of a basic choice of national and international strategy, based on the question: Will the world advance to socialism by means of coexistence and peaceful competition or by revolution? FRAP leadership, and the leadership of the Chilean Communist Party in particular, was firm in defending peaceful coexistence as the path toward socialism. The inescapable consequence was the carrying out of a campaign that was to prove to the world that existing governmental structures could be changed gradually, by means of elections, without recurring to violent mass action.

The exclusion of violence did not signify merely the barring of arms or guerrilla action, which is merely a circumstantial form of violence; violence in all its basic social forms was ruled out: strikes, demonstrations, decision-making committees that challenge official government authority, the taking over of land or factories, all the techniques of mass social action which have always accompanied and characterized revolutions.

The Rules of the Game

The Right realized and feared that the masses were determined to use such methods; there had been a thousand and one warning signals. But the FRAP leadership demonstrated at every opportunity that it accepted the rules of the electoral game, that it was opposed to any steps that might lead to revolutionary action. Such rules of the game concealed traps.

The first trap, and the most obvious one, was the fact that soldiers, minors (those under twenty-one), and illiterates do not vote. This excludes from electoral participation a high percentage of the poorest and most exploited segment of the population, a great majority of which is pro-FRAP. Out of eight million inhabitants, only two and a half million voted in the September election.

The second trap, and the most destructive one, is the ruling out of techniques of social action that are characteristic of the working class. This deprives it of the means of attracting other sectors of the population to its side, and leaves the way open for the Right's campaign, based on money, propaganda, and fraud, to advance unchallenged. To fight a defensive campaign under these circumstances is a waste of effort. The only way

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to demolish the Right in the existing context is to show in action, in social struggles, that the forces of FRAP—above all, the working class—are ready, willing, and strong enough to make basic changes in society.

Such an approach has a dual effect: it reveals the working class in all its strength to other popular sectors, and stimulates these sectors to ally themselves with it; the Right and the Christian Democratic reformists are forced to abandon the terrain of promises and declarations and to take stands on crucial social actions that affect the population directly: demonstrations, strikes and related struggles for wage increases and other demands, land distribution, etc. At that point many of those within the poorer strata of the population who formerly could not see any difference between Frei's "revolution with liberty" and FRAP's "legal revolution" will at last see clearly just whose interests are represented and defended by each group.

By voluntarily renouncing this possibility, because of its belief in evolutionary socialism, the FRAP leadership renounced, in effect, not only the winning of real power, but also the winning of a simple electoral majority at the polling booths. Their renunciation decided the election. The Right's high command understood what was happening. It preferred to wait confidently for Election Day rather than precipitate a coup.

But was the election a triumph for the traditional Right? In reality the old-line capitalist parties were out of the running from the start. Liberals and Conservatives were obliged to support Christian Democracy. The nature of contemporary Chilean society can be deduced from the fact that the capitalist order, in order to subsist, has had to renounce its own parties, aligning itself with a reformist group which even has its own left wing, complete with semi-socialist and anti-imperialist slogans! This was the only means of mustering a vote large enough to block the other alternative—a victory for the Socialist-Communist front.

Those who see only FRAP's defeat at the polls are not looking deeply enough into the Chilean situation. Christian Democracy's triumph was strictly qualified by two circumstances. First, many of its votes came from the masses who were attracted to it by its reform program. These voters thought it

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would be easier to win reforms with a Christian Democratic administration. They will demand measures designed to lessen existing inequities; but it will be impossible to institute them without challenging at least some of the capitalist, oligarchic interests which constitute Frei's support on the extreme Right. With Christian Democracy in the saddle, the process of social polarization that characterizes present day Chile will be accelerated under the impact of an accumulation of economic and social problems which cannot be resolved within the existing social structure. The second circumstance that qualifies Christian Democracy's election victory is that the new regime will be confronted not by a disorganized Rightist opposition but by a unified mass, whose solid core is the Chilean proletariat, mobilized around FRAP and oriented toward a socialist revolution.

The Working Class Vote

Christian Democracy, which is hardly a traditional right-wing force, won the elections. But if we are to understand the forces that are stirring in Chile, the focal point of our attention should not be the Christian Democratic victory but rather the vote won by FRAP even with its timid, conciliatory, "defensive" campaign (the term is that of the Central Committee of the CP).

These votes came from an organized source. Not in vain was the working class the driving force in the *allendista* committees. If election figures are analyzed, municipality by municipality, it is easy to see that FRAP won a majority in all clearly working class areas. In the six provinces where workers are numerous FRAP rolled up a winning vote—in Tarapacá, Antofagasta, and Atacama in the north (mines and nitrate fields); in Concepción and Arauco (coal, steel, textiles), and in Magallanes in the far south. In the two large provinces of Santiago and Valparaiso, where the bourgeoisie and upper middle class are concentrated, Frei collected close to four hundred thousand votes, almost enough to give him his majority.

In 1963 the parties constituting FRAP won 27.4 percent of the municipal election vote, the coalition that supported Frei 49.8 percent, and the Radical Party 22.6 percent. In the recent election FRAP's vote rose to 38.6 percent and Frei's to

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56.6 percent, while the Radicals were virtually wiped out by the polarization of forces.

In virtually every province the vote followed class lines. FRAP was victorious in working class districts, often polling absolute majorities, whereas in contiguous non-working class areas Frei was the winner. In bourgeois districts his lead was enormous.

Examples abound. In Arica FRAP increased its vote from 36.9 percent in 1961 to 48 percent in 1964; in Iquique from 29.8 percent to 48.1 percent; in Antofagasta from 30 percent to 47.2 percent; in Tocopilla from 39.2 percent to 56.4 percent; in Tierra Amarilla from 35.9 percent to 59 percent. These are all workers' districts. In Calera and Nogales, mining centers located in Valparaiso province, FRAP had won 52.5 percent and 54.7 percent in 1961; in 1964 the percentage increased to 54.3 and 61.6. In the mining communities of Concepción and Arauco provinces, FRAP's majority was absolute, often overwhelmingly so. The voting pattern was the same in the industrial areas of Tomé, Penco and others. In Llanquihue, which was carried by the Christian Democrats, the industrial areas were nonetheless won by FRAP.

The more deeply statistics are analyzed, the more clearly one key fact emerges: the working class is indisputably the core of the Socialist-Communist coalition, the working class is solidly behind FRAP. Over and beyond its purely electoral role, this cohesive class is a key factor in Chilean life and social struggles.

The significance of the voting figures given above would be diminished if Frei were able to improve the conditions of the Chilean masses, if he could find the means to raise wages and the standard of living. But he cannot possibly achieve this goal without threatening the interests that backed him and, indeed, the capitalist system itself. The situation is such that even moderate reforms, such as the Goulart regime unsuccessfully attempted to introduce in Brazil, could only be achieved through revolutionary means, through a quasi-revolution. A sizable number of those who voted for Frei—even though they are nowhere near as well organized or as homogeneous as FRAP voters—will demand such reforms, pressuring Christian Democracy's

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left wing to force them through. Frei's attempt to ally himself with the Socialists reflects an effort to contain this pressure. Successful containment can only be achieved by meeting at least some demands, but the means exist for offering only the most limited concessions.

A Conviction and a Program

The election has provided a temporary solution for the existing state of social crisis in Chile, of which the large FRAP vote is a reflection. But it has not solved the basic problems. To the extent that Frei's government will be unable to provide such a solution there will be a further polarization of the masses. Those who voted for Frei will move closer to FRAP when they discover that it is this group which is taking the initiative in social struggles.

Inasmuch as the working class expected a FRAP victory at the polls, the defeat came as a considerable jolt. But this setback did not lead to despondency or organizational disintegration. On the contrary, political-social activities are undiminished; and Frei, in his post-victory statements, has attempted to reassure and conciliate the masses rather than the traditional Right.

An electoral victory for Allende would have signified an immediate, prodigious, and violent rising of the masses. As in Cuba after Batista's fall, nothing and nobody could have kept them in check. Herein lies the true analogy with Cuba, not in the area of guerrilla activities, which is of secondary importance. But such a victory proved to be impossible because the Left curbed and hamstrung itself, rejecting the methods and program which could have mobilized a large part of the population behind the working class.

Such are the primary issues in the open discussion taking place among Socialist and Communist activists in Chile today. It is a discussion involving nothing less than the development of a correct strategy to be followed by a force representing forty percent of the vote and an even higher proportion of the general population, a force characterized by infinitely greater cohesion than its adversaries possess or can ever possess. It is, furthermore, a discussion based on the collective experience of

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mobilizing for action in a revolutionary situation. Even though the Left did not triumph, it was not destroyed nor even disorganized. In the future the same critical problems will continue to arise. And no one will be able to convince this mass to content itself with hopes of a solution in the "next election."

The Italian Communist journal *Rinascità,* in its assessment of the Chilean election results, concluded that it was the tactic of the Workers Front (rather than the "broader" Liberation Front, which would include sectors of the so-called "progressive bourgeoisie") and the socialist character of its program which lost votes for FRAP, and that it would therefore be necessary to water the program down. The conclusion of the Socialist and Communist activists who participated in, who lived the electoral experience, is diametrically opposed. The comment quoted at the beginning of this article sums it up most cogently. Although the Central Committee of the Chilean CP is essentially in agreement with the Italian CP that the electoral path leads to the winning of power, it has had to acknowledge that the campaign was "defensive" and therefore in error.

One million votes for FRAP. The great mass of people who had mobilized themselves to carry FRAP to power acted on the conviction that the country's problems could be solved only through the instrument of FRAP, only through putting power in the hands of Socialists and Communists. They hoped that this goal could be won through elections. Their hope was not realized, but their conviction remains; and such conviction is in itself a program. Their unity has been maintained intact. In the period now beginning, in the dynamic and changing reality of the Chilean nation that is heir to all the old, unsolved problems, this mass of one million will be the instrument of all decisive change.

He who gives himself entirely to his fellow-men appears to them useless and selfish; but he who gives himself partially to them is pronounced a benefactor and philanthropist.

—*Henry David Thoreau*

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COMMENT ON "THE ORDEAL OF BRITISH GUIANA"

BY SIR JOCK CAMPBELL

As you would expect, I have read Philip Reno's *The Ordeal of British Guiana* with great interest. Many of the observations on the past record of colonialism in British Guiana are merited, but there are errors of fact and of interpretation in his references to Bookers which cannot be allowed to go uncorrected. I will take them in the order they occur in the text.

> p. 19: "The sugar companies set out at once to rectify the British mistake in granting self government to a people so misled."

This reference to the suspension of the constitution by the British Government in 1953 is not true. Bookers, which is by far the larger of the two sugar companies, had nothing at all to do with suspending the constitution; nor did the smaller sugar company.

> p. 38: "Apprised of the opposition to his proposals, Kaldor, according to the London *Sunday Times,* responded: 'The men behind the British Guiana crisis . . . are British, American, and local businessmen who for years have been avoiding the 45 percent company profits tax.' "

This reference to the budget disturbances of 1962 notably fails to mention that in a subsequent issue of the *Sunday Times* a letter appeared from Mr. Kaldor in which he wrote that he wished "to dissociate myself with certain statements attributed to me in connection with British Guiana." And went on to say "I did not say that the 'British and American' firms were 'behind the current crisis,' or that they 'for years have been avoid-

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Sir Jock Campbell is the Chairman of the Booker Group of companies, operating sugar plantations and other enterprises in British Guiana. Bookers is the largest single factor in the British Guianese economy.

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ing the 45 percent company profits tax.' I did express the view that 'business circles have been fermenting trouble' but I had hoped that I made it clear that in the case of British Guiana the circles I had in mind were mainly local. As to the tax avoidance, I said that *some* British and American firms have avoided tax by charging arbitrary prices in transactions with associated companies but this is by no means true of *all.* In fact my investigation convinced me that the most important British concern [i.e. Bookers] operating in British Guiana should be given a clean bill of health from the tax point of view, and I so informed Dr. Jagan's Government."

p.: 52: "MPCA representation could be changed only if a majority of workers went individually into company offices and signed withdrawals from the MPCA dues checkoff. Workers were reluctant to do this, since firings of PPP supporters were fresh in their minds, and mechanization made the fear of lay-offs even more real."

There have been no firings of People's Progressive Party (PPP) supporters; and workers can sign withdrawal forms from the Man-Power Citizens' Association (MPCA), the recognized union, at either estate personnel offices or the offices of the union itself (witnessed signing is necessary to guard against misrepresentation or forgery).

p. 54: "As in February of 1962, employers and TUC worked together in the 1963 general strike. Only 2,000 out of 20,000 sugar workers responded to the strike call, but the rest were locked out as Bookers and the Demerara Co. lined up with the other employers."

There was no lockout. Man-days worked in the sugar industry during the strike period were 612,000, compared with 790,000 during exactly the same period of 1962—hardly an index of a lockout! At a time of high world prices Bookers had every interest in maintaining production.

p. 54: "Bookers' ships refused to enter Georgetown or New Amsterdam harbors."

This is another reference to 1963 which is not true. Indeed, one Booker ship remained in Georgetown throughout the strike, unloaded because of the strike of waterfront workers; and an-

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other ship could not get into Georgetown because of the strike of pilots.

> p. 65: "Bookers' many words of sympathy for Guiana's welfare were drowned out by British troops patrolling sugar areas, and by police under British direction invading workers' homes. The sugar industry, in the midst of one of the most profitable years in its history, determined to sacrifice short-run gain for long-run power, and girded for battle."

This is a total, and incredible, distortion of the 1964 situation. Is it suggested that Bookers are responsible for British troops in British Guiana? In 1963 they were asked for by the Premier, Dr. Jagan; in 1964 by the Governor. The basic reason for the presence of British troops in British Guiana in 1964 is dissension between Indians and Africans and between government and opposition parties. Bookers, employing as we do people of all races and parties, have no conceivable vested interest in such dissension. Nor have we any desire to sacrifice "short-run gain." The interruption to Bookers' spring crop, which was only about two thirds of normal output (though producing this amount was a remarkable achievement) is a serious blow not only for Bookers but also for British Guiana.

> p. 85: "The high profits—most of which are repatriated—and freedom from taxes seems a high price for a poor country to pay for investment."

Though this passage, I think, refers to new small investment, some readers may think it also applies to large companies like Bookers. If they do, I must say that Bookers' profits are far from being high in relation to the capital invested (in 1963, despite the benefit of higher sugar prices, the overall return on shareholders' capital employed was 6.9 percent), and even from these, British Guiana taxes take about 60 percent.

> p. 88: "As of mid-1963 there was no unemployment insurance or old age pension plan, or severance pay for workers displaced through mechanization."

A sugar industry pension plan has been awaiting implementation since 1962, and has been held up only by the failure of the British Guiana government to pass some necessary enabling legislation. There has been a severance pay agreement in

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operation since 1961, and severance payments were in fact first made in 1955. Unemployment insurance is, of course, not the responsibility of employers.

p. 93: "Bookers' British Guiana chief, Antony Tasker . . . loads Bookers' offices with PPP opponents."

This implies that party political affiliation or sympathy is a factor in Bookers' employment policy. This criticism has been levelled at Bookers and Mr. Tasker on several occasions in recent years, generally in the context of the employment with Bookers of the Chairman (Mrs. W. Gaskin) and a leading member (Dr. P. A. Reid) of the PNC and the United Force Senator (Miss A. Jardim). The essential facts about these three Booker executives are that Mrs. Gaskin was recruited in October 1955, and did not identify herself with the PNC until some two years later; Dr. Reid, who applied for employment to Bookers in Britain and was appointed to British Guiana in October 1958, took no part in politics until the 1961 elections; and Miss Jardim, who was both recruited and trained (in personnel management) by Bookers in Britain, took no part in politics until after she had been appointed to British Guiana in January 1961. Furthermore, while Mr. Tasker was responsible for recruiting Mrs. Gaskin he was in no way involved in the appointments of Dr. Reid or Miss Jardim. In any case, all three were appointed to posts for which they were well qualified by training or experience, or both.

Bookers employ supporters of all political parties and of none. We impose *no* political tests in either recruitment or promotion. Incidentally, it may here be worth mentioning that Bookers' Information Officer in British Guiana, Mr. Martin Carter, suggested to Mr. Reno on several occasions that he should arrange for him to see Mr. Tasker, but on each occasion Mr. Reno did not follow up the suggestion.

p. 94: "The reason for the contradiction between Jock Campbell's words and Bookers' actions is no doubt simply that Bookers is a corporation, and that Jock Campbell is a realist."

I do not know exactly what this means: but I think it is meant fairly kindly towards me. It is not the first attempt to

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draw a distinction between myself as an individual and as chairman in London and my colleagues and Bookers as a company in British Guiana.

This is as wounding to them and me, as unfounded. In interpretation it must be remembered *they* bear the heat and burden of the day—the daily practical problems—in British Guiana: *I* am away from it all in London. Moreover *I* can formulate and express one single viewpoint of one man: *they*—Booker staff and management in British Guiana—because 90 percent of them are Guianese inevitably reflect all the conflicts and dissensions in Guianese society. In fact what is remarkable is the identity between my policy, strategic objectives, and work in London and the ideals and achievements of the Booker Group in British Guiana.

> p. 120: "British government grants to British Guiana have been running between $4 and $5 million a year. Bookers' income taxes, both United Kingdom and overseas, have been just under $6 million a year over the same period. To the United Kingdom taxes on the two thirds of Bookers' profits which the company attributes to its British Guiana operations must be added the taxes of the Demerara and other companies and a share of the personal income taxes of numerous individuals."

Without wishing to suggest that British government grants to British Guiana have been particularly large, it must be pointed out that of the taxes we pay on our profits in British Guiana about 85 percent go to the British Guiana government and only about 15 percent to the United Kingdom. This is mainly due to the operations of "double taxation relief" which Mr. Reno seems to have overlooked.

Apart from the reference to page 94, which must inevitably be a matter of opinion, I have confined this letter to errors of fact or understanding. I always feel in sympathy with any attempt to enlighten the world about the true facts and problems of British Guiana—that at present unhappy and divided country. For that reason especially I wish Mr. Reno had been able to keep his facts straight. I must leave your readers to judge the accuracy of the rest of *The Ordeal of British Guiana.*

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REPLY TO SIR JOCK CAMPBELL

By Philip Reno

Sir Jock Campbell's objections to "errors of fact and interpretation" in my book about British Guiana should be answered carefully, and not only because readers are entitled to reporting as truly factual as possible. The nature of the objections, as well as the answers to them, indicate the basis of some of Guiana's troubles, and the means necessary to correct them. I have grouped my answers according to subject matter of the objections, in order to save space and to help bring out what their meaning seems to be.

Sir Jock says first that it is an error, and later says that it is "a total and incredible distortion of the facts," to assert that the sugar companies were responsible for British troops being called into British Guiana in 1953 and 1964. The question at issue is basically: Who makes critical policy decisions in British Guiana? Marxists have long held a consistent view of the decision-making process in a class society, and in recent years there have been a good many studies by non-Marxist social scientists of the power and compliance structure of countries and communities. It is, in fact, somewhat surprising to run into a reaction such as Sir Jock's, and particularly so from a sophisticated observer from the country that gave the generic name to decision-making elites.

No one would deny that Bookers is a key segment of the British Guiana Establishment, and at least in Caribbean affairs operates at upper levels of the British Establishment in London. That Bookers did not give the order calling in the troops does not mean that Bookers was not a preponderant element in the consensus of Establishment opinion from which the order developed. The legal steps in such a decision are merely channels for the articulation of a consensus in the Establishment. Sir Jock's objection seems to me to rest on superficial formalism rather than substantive reality.

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Another group of Sir Jock's objections to my book concern Bookers' role in the 1963 general strike. This strike was, you will recall, quite obviously instigated by the AFL-CIO to bring down the Jagan government. Joining the strike was the MPCA, which Bookers recognizes as representing its workers, and which functions as a trade union arm of United States policy. Sir Jock states that Bookers did not lock out its workers but maintained production during the strike.

The facts are that Bookers did lock out the workers, and resumed production only under pressure from the British Guiana government and the sugar workers. Here is the way Dr. Jagan reports (in a recent letter) what actually went on:

> Bookers locked out the workers. . . . At first the Sugar Producers' Association said that there were not enough skilled workers to operate the factories. I told them that they should advertise and they would get a lot of skilled workers who had been displaced over the years. They were reluctant to do this. I then suggested that they could consolidate the available skilled labor and operate their factories in rotation; also operate one or two instead of three shifts a day. The answer given me was that if they commenced operation they would have a bottleneck at the bulk storage loading plant, which was on strike. When the workers at this plant went back to work a few weeks later, I went back to the sugar producers and told them that they could now function since the bottleneck was removed. They then said that they were afraid of sabotage. This kind of excuse went on for some time.

The figures on time worked that Sir Jock presents do not show Bookers' interest in production so much as the sugar workers determination not to support the AFL-CIO-MPCA strike.

Sir Jock goes on to say that my statement is untrue that Bookers refused to continue shipping during the strike. The two examples he gives to support his contention are, oddly enough, of Bookers' ships not moving. No doubt his point is that they failed to move because the strike made it impossible, and not because Bookers was unwilling to move them. The point will not stand up, however. The British Guiana government guaranteed that ships would be loaded and unloaded, and other ships did load and unload. Remember that the government had to get food and other necessities into the country. The government held repeated conferences with the Shipping Association, dom-

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inated by the sugar companies, trying vainly to get them to move in needed goods. One of Bookers' ships which was tied up for a long time in Georgetown harbor contained salt and other supplies needed by the people. Bookers refused even to bring the ship alongside the wharf for the supplies to be unloaded until the government requisitioned the supplies.

Following the general strike, the GAWU (the sugar workers' union which supports the PPP) sought recognition from Bookers and, when refused, struck. Sir Jock disagrees with my characterization of the strike and of sugar company responsibility for the repression and violence which accompanied it. I naturally respect Sir Jock's right to his view of the cause of Guiana's troubles (which is much the same as the official British view), but to me it is simply hogwash. For the reasons why I think this is so, and why I think it is Sir Jock's interpretation that is "inaccurate," I could only repeat what is in my book. As to the low production resulting from the GAWU strike being "a serious blow not only for Bookers but also for British Guiana," Bookers has to blame only its own intransigent refusal to permit its workers a union of their own choosing.

In the book I repeat as a fact GAWU charges that Bookers has fired workers sympathetic to the PPP. Sir Jock states that "there have been no firings of PPP supporters." Is it possible that he has not heard of the many cases of discrimination occurring throughout recent years? The GAWU is even now fighting to reinstate workers fired for joining the strike for recognition. You can hardly attend a sugar workers' meeting without running into some one who has been victimized because of union or PPP activities. Militant workers are forced out of work and out of the plantations, or victimized in various ways. Bookers' record of discrimination against the GAWU and in favor of the MPCA is too well known to be hidden behind bland assurances. How much better it would be for Bookers as well as for the Guianese if Sir Jock would face the facts, instead of pretending they do not exist.

Sir Jock also says that, contrary to my report, there is severance pay for sugar workers, and that an old age pension plan has been held up only because of failure of the British Guiana government to pass enabling legislation. The govern-

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ment did not approve the sugar company-MPCA proposals because they were totally inadequate. The sugar workers themselves objected, through the GAWU and through independent meetings, but Bookers and the MPCA refused to listen. Under the proposals, the companies were to make contributions equal to the worker contributions, even though Bookers makes higher percentage contributions to the pension scheme for Bookers' administrative and store employees in Georgetown. The government brought in an expert, through UN and ILO aid, to study the Bookers-MPCA proposal. His recommendations are now in, and the government can move ahead on plans really in the interest of the sugar workers.

Several of Sir Jock's objections concern Bookers' profits and the taxes paid on them. First, let me state what I must have failed to make clear in the book, that I did not intend any implication that Bookers has been evading payment of taxes legally due, or that Bookers' profits have been exorbitant. Briefly regarding particular objections, I do not see how Kaldor's partial retraction (which I did not know of) affects the points in the book about the 1962 riots. I was aware of the "double taxation relief" enjoyed by British corporations operating in other countries, but was not able to ascertain from Bookers' report that 85 percent of taxes paid by Bookers on profits made in British Guiana goes to British Guiana. The point of all the figures was that Britain takes far more out of British Guiana, through British taxes and sugar company profits, than she puts back. The point is valid, although British government tax revenues are somewhat smaller than I expected.

Other objections which Sir Jock raises relate to Bookers' British Guiana staff. The Bookers administrative staff was, as far as I could tell, predominantly identified with the anti-PPP campaigns of the British, the Americans, and the Georgetown upper middle class. This is perfectly natural, since Bookers' administrative staff are members of the middle and upper middle classes. The point in my book was that if Bookers genuinely wants a constructive role in Guianese affairs, its staff must achieve a perspective beyond their present bitterly partisan point of view. Those of us who went through the New Deal in Washington recall with near anguish the way old line bureaucrats

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scuttled a score of hopeful programs. Without some imaginative training and recruitment policies, no constructive program by Bookers will get off the ground.

With regard to the particular passage Sir Jock picks out, his objection may well be more justified. The fact that many of the staff are actively anti-Jagan may simply be because they are representative of the class from which they are drawn, and not because Mr. Tasker, Bookers' British Guiana chief, discriminates in employment. There is, however, a real question here which Sir Jock does not face. Apparently he finds no conflict between Miss Jardim's personnel work for Bookers and her intense far-right political activities, her antics in the Black Friday riots, her recent visit to Washington to stir up Cold War Congressmen with faked charges and "evidence" of Russian money, and all the rest. Nor does Sir Jock's defense of particular Bookers employees mention the explosives found buried in Reid's yard last year when set off by a fire started to burn rubbish. Assuming that Sir Jock writes off these activities in the name of political freedom, he should at least face the question of whether similar activities by a PPP supporter would be tolerated.

I had no wish to wound the feelings of Sir Jock, or anyone else, and it is my belief that Mr. Tasker is an upstanding gentleman, as no doubt are the British Governor and the American Consul. But the real wounds in Guiana are not suffered by these gentlemen, or by the Bookers staff, but are suffered by the Guianese people at the hands of British and American imperialism and imperialist agents, and in some parts at the hands of the Bookers staff.

Finally, Sir Jock goes to some pains to dispel any mistaken opinion which might result from my "attempt to draw a distinction between [him] as an individual and as chairman of Bookers." My attempt was quite different: I believe that Sir Jock is an interesting phenomenon among industrialists, but his policies for Bookers are, and are necessarily, based on business (and class and imperialist) interests.

I must admit, in summary, that I was very disappointed by Sir Jock's letter. He has met none of the issues confronting British Guiana and Bookers, although he obviously disagrees with my views and conclusions. Instead of meeting issues he has,

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following a common practice, covered his disagreement with charges of "error." Some of the "errors" turn out, upon examination, to be merely views different from his, others to be quite trivial. But in most cases the charge of error itself is based on misinformation, and all seem directed to unquestioning justification of Bookers' recent record. This is too bad, because if one thing only could be expected of Sir Jock, it would be recognition that people in developing countries are just not going to put up any longer with the old exploitation. At any rate, the meaning of all this is clear enough—Guiana's future depends on struggle by the Guianese themselves; and as they achieve solidarity in their struggle, relations with the United States and Britain, and with American and British companies, will fall into place.

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

One Week in October 1964

(1) Peoples' China exploded a nuclear bomb; pushed open the carefully guarded doors of the exclusive Nuclear Club, and sat down without a by-your-leave at the technological summit, with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. Once again invention, ingenuity, enterprise, courage, and mass action have broken down monopoly barriers and made a mockery of the "awesome might" of military power. Was it not Dulles who said: "We must look upon the Peking regime as impermanent rather than permanent?" Another of man's premature prejudgments and best laid plans gone awry.

(2) Nikita Khrushchev's power structure, built of personal ambitions, words, wisecracks, grandiose schemes for reaping bountiful crops from dry-land farming, and multiple excursions into summit power politics, was pushed from its pinnacle and relegated to the dust-bin of history with jabs, cuffs, and denunciations and without so much as a "thank you" for his decade of good-humored, imaginative, if opportunistic leadership. How quickly world glory fades. How complete is the eclipse that follows on erroneous judgments and false assumptions.

(3) Britain's Conservative Prime Minister handed in his hat check to the waiting attendant. His comfortable majority in Parliament had vanished. The British electorate, polled on the issues, approved the shift in ministries and, by a tiny majority of four members in a House composed of six hundred, asked the Labour Party to swear eternal loyalty to one of the few remaining hereditary European monarchs. (Even as late as 1914 Europe swarmed with monarchs who exercised varying degrees of personal authority. Today, except for Britain, Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Monaco—all in the free enterprise West—the species "monarch" is extinct in Europe.)

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(4) Washington, capital of the richest nation on earth, with the most powerful navy, with air cover over the Atlantic and the Pacific, and a stockpile of nuclear weapons sufficient to depopulate the planet several times over, was confessing its inability to defeat a handful of South Vietnamese "rebels," poorly armed and badly equipped (except for supplies "made in U.S.A." and taken from the enemy). The Viet Cong has one asset—the confidence and support of the Vietnamese people. George Washington's ragged army of Continentals, Mao Tse-tung's People's Liberation Army, and Fidel Castro's Rebel Army were equally destitute, and possessed the same asset.

Historians will often note and long remember this momentous week in October 1964. Its events underlined the goings and comings of mighty social forces and of major world events.

New Economic Assignment

President Johnson, talking in Washington to "a group of labor leaders," said that if the tax cut did not provide full employment under private enterprise, the government would step up its program of public works. "The time has come," he continued, "for labor and government and business to agree that we are going to achieve—and keep—full employment."

Contrasting the United States with Western Europe, where there is practically no unemployment, the President said, "We too must catch up with modern history."

This recognition by President Johnson that the United States economy is a laggard among Western nations is borne out fully by the Swedish economist, Gunnar Myrdal, who wrote in his *Challenge to Affluence* (New York, 1963): "For several years the sluggish and jerky development of the American economy has given reason for anxiety. . . . The most important problem in the world today is how to move the American economy out of the automatism of relative economic stagnation." After a detailed reference to Western Europe's experiences with economic growth, Myrdal writes that the United States "has lagged behind in applying the new knowledge we have about how to induce economic progress."

With a new mandate from United States voters and Myr-

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dal's handbook on postwar economic prosperity in capitalist Europe, there is no good reason why the Johnson-Humphrey team should hesitate to take the many steps needed to bring American capitalism up to date.

History Backs U.S. Radicals

Certainly the most exciting chapter in Howard Mumford Jones' new book *O Strange New World* is headed "The Radical Republic." Like all students of cultural history, the author is so mired down by the immense amount and variety of his subject matter that he seldom comes up with a workable generalization. Chapter 8 on The Radical Republic is no exception to this rule, but it does sparkle here and there with some fine gems. The opening lines of the chapter give an idea of this quality:

> It is difficult for contemporary Americans, who have abolished the radical Left and seem not to know how to manage the radical Right, to realize that at its inception and for many years thereafter the United States was viewed abroad (and sometimes at home) with that mingling of hope and horror we later showered upon Soviet Russia. The young nation was an ebullient republic in a world of monarchies. . . . It had a radical federal constitution couched in philosophic terms. . . . The new state was charged with being a democracy when democracy was a term of abuse. It lacked a reigning house and a landed aristocracy but it had (perhaps as a result) a bad record for mob violence, political instability, and defiance of decent custom.

"What was the world coming to?" Mr. Jones asks, rhetorically. The answer came in the birth year of the United States Constitution (1789) with "an explosion that changed the culture of Europe. The French Revolution, clearly, had been triggered by the example of the radical Americans. . . . The inauguration of Washington in April 1789 preceded by only five days the fateful meeting of the three Estates at Versailles on May 4 and by only about ten weeks the storming of the Bastille on July 14."

Historical events surrounding and following the adoption of the Constitution of 1789 introduced "a strain of radicalism in American history that is often inconsistent but always in-

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teresting." Professor Jones describes these events in a sentence: "Instability was of the essence of the American nation."

The author lists the revolts, rebellions, and instances of mob violence and lynch law that dotted the early years of United States history. But, he concludes, "mob action was not an American invention"; it has been a feature of social crises throughout the history of Western man.

Eighteenth-century Americans "did not think of themselves as crude or barbarous, but as the heirs of all the ages in the foremost files of time. . . . They believed they were opening a new epoch in the history of mankind." Does that not sound like today's radicals?

Certainly the *majority* of the English colonials in North America were not radicals. But just as certainly the "best people" of Western and Central Europe, during the stormy times from 1770 to 1815, looked upon America and the Americans of that period as dangerously, destructively radical. Revolutions, if followed to their logical conclusions, are by their very nature radical. The men and women who organized and directed the American Revolution were at least as radical as similarly placed revolutionaries in other times and under other conditions.

Then and Now

Descendants of the women and men who made up the hard core of colonial radicalism, followed Washington to Valley Forge, supported Jefferson's untoward demands for the Bill of Rights (which is presently the most hotly contested section of the Constitution), and took part in a presidential election in November 1964.

Popular elections, which only recently in Western Europe were looked upon as subversive and dangerous departures from safe and respectable monarchial rule, are a dime a dozen in 20th-century United States. Every village, town, county, city, and state has periodic popular elections in which all first-class citizens may cast their secret ballots for the candidates of their choice. At least in theory, any first-class citizen, before Election Day, may announce his or her candidacy and have his or her name printed or written on the official ballot.

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There are, to be sure, limitations and discriminations which restrict both voting and candidacy. The voter must be registered in advance of Election Day. The candidate, to have a place on the only legal ballot, must secure signatures or other evidences of a public support which assures at least a modest degree of status.

Again, there are the second-class and perhaps the third-class United States citizens to whom "Equal Justice Under Law" is a hollow mockery. Foreign born workers, who have labored for years and reared families in the United States but who have dared to associate with dangerous thoughts or suspect organizations, are civic outcasts. So are people with black skins in Alabama, Mississippi, and some other of the fifty states which comprise the United States of America. These and other limitations, such as age, conviction for crime, and mental incompetence, further limit participation in United States "free" elections.

Consequent upon these limitations, the number of United States citizens eligible to take part in popular elections is about 100 million—slightly more than half of the total population. On great occasions, one day in each four years when a President is elected, only about two thirds go to the polls and vote, despite insistent prodding and ballyhoo. In 1960, 64 million ballots were cast; in 1964 about 70 million ballots. At best, a presidential election is therefore a minority affair.

There are other limitations on presidential elections. Voters do not elect a president. They express a choice between candidates. The actual selection is made by electors, chosen by voters. The election is not direct, but hedged against "the mob." This is a formal limitation on presidential selections. The real limitation is in the naming of candidates.

In 1964 there were two major candidates for the presidency. One was selected by a Republican Convention meeting in San Francisco, the other by a Democratic Convention meeting in Atlantic City. Preceding these conventions there were primary elections in many states at which voters expressed preferences and selected delegates to the national conventions. Two names emerged from these filters within filters—the Re-

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publican, Senator Goldwater; the Democratic candidate, President Johnson.

Behind and within this vast electoral mechanism was another limiting factor: the industrial-financial-military-public relations oligarchy which owns and/or controls almost every aspect of organized United States life and is therefore able to shape United States public opinion as a minting machine puts its stamp on coin blanks. In the 1964 election, both candidates had the support of important segments of the oligarchy. Without that support they could not have been nominated. Another limitation: presidential nominations and electors are confined to the rich or those backed by the rich. There are no reliable figures on 1964 pre-election expenses of candidates and parties. The total must have been in the tens of millions of dollars.

Quite incidentally, it should be noted that no Communist Party took part in the 1964 election, and that socialist participation was fragmentary and scantily reported. The Communist Party has not played a serious political role since it was pushed off the ballot in 1944 by strong-arm tactics. During the ensuing twenty years the CPUSA has been excluded by legal and extra-legal means from participation in public elections. The Socialists, who cast nearly a million ballots as late as 1936, were reduced to 75,000 by 1960.

Out of this immense electoral computing machine in 1964 there emerged a Republican candidate, Senator Goldwater, who by his own declaration wishes to go back to earlier economic and political forms. That is, he is a *reactionary*. His opponent, President Johnson, believes in and urges continuance of the present American Way of Life. That is, he is a *conservative*. So the election of 1964 was a race between a conservative and a reactionary. The millions of United States voters who are by conviction and choice either liberal or radical had, in general, no possible way of expressing their political convictions.

In 1789, at the birth of the United States of North America, radicalism was in the air and radicals were in office, exercising authority. In 1964 the United States Left has been so thoroughly suppressed that the electoral contest was waged between a conservative and a reactionary. The Right was cock of the roost.

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THE TRIPLE REVOLUTION: SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

By Todd Gitlin

In the November issue of MR we published an editorial on "The Triple Revolution" and an article "Beyond Automation" by George and Louise Crowley. Offprints of these two pieces were sent to the members of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution, inviting comment; and in the editorial this invitation was extended to all MR readers. The first of the earliest replies received is presented below. We remind readers that the deadline for copy to be included in any given issue is the first of the preceding month. Each month's selection must be determined in part by space considerations, so the fact that a contribution sent in before the deadline does not appear in the next issue does not mean that it may not be published later. Contributors to the discussion who wish to be identified should include a sentence or two of biographical information.—The Editors

I think radicals must think about The Triple Revolution with certain fundamental questions of analysis and strategy carefully in mind:

(1) What are the actual, projected, and possible extents of cybernation in the American economy?

(2) What do the working class and, below it, the poor think of traditional work?

(3) What do we—radicals, organizers—think of traditional work; and how does that answer relate—in terms of program, strategy, tactics—to the answer to (2)? Assuming machines and computers can do most of the work that now remunerates Americans, how will and how should the displaced workers use their lives? From another angle, what are the alternative models of a cybernated society?

(4) Assuming a desired vision of the future, a utopia if you will, what is the agency of change?

These questions clearly blend into one another, and answers to one depend on answers to the others (and to still others not

* Todd Gitlin is past president of Students for a Democratic Society and currently coordinator of its Peace Research and Education Project. He was one of the signers of "The Triple Revolution."

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considered here); yet if our object is to clarify the debate, they may be usefully taken up one at a time. Because of space limitations my remarks can only be indicative of further questions to be raised, experiments to be made, projects to be undertaken.

(1) What is, will be, and can be the extent of cybernation? Unfortunately, there are no clear answers to the first two parts, in "The Triple Revolution" or elsewhere. One reason, perhaps the major one, is integral to the system. An economist of my acquaintance tells the story of a friend of his at Cornell's School of Industrial Relations who decided to do a study of automation in Buffalo. He consulted both the Central Labor Council and the Chamber of Commerce of that city and won their approval. Armed with these credentials, he began visiting corporate executives to inquire about the degree of present and projected automation in their companies. Not one would talk with him: "If we tell you, our competitors will find out." The point of the story, in case it is a bit murky, is that automation/cybernation is a road to profit, and few maps exist of private thoroughfares. Thus we know as little in quantitative terms about corporate plans for automation as we do about the actual processes of corporate decision. The debate about the real-life quantity of cybernation—say, between Robert Theobald in *Free Men and Free Markets* and Edwin Dale in *The New Republic*—is at the present time a fruitless one.

On the other hand, there is less dispute about the job-eliminating *potential* of the new technology. The high estimate is that of RAND economist Richard Bellman, who asserts that given present technical trends two percent of the population could produce all material goods. *Fortune, Newsweek,* the *Advanced Management Journal,* and many other periodicals and professional organs, indicate the potential of cybernation for wiping out not only most blue-collar jobs but also most office and "middle management" positions. Theobald, James Boggs, and others emphasize that engineering skill, if unleashed, could eliminate most traditional work—including construction work, the mainstay of all public-works proposals.

(2) What do workers and poor people think of all this? It is easy to speculate, but there is little solid evidence. The pre-

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valence of wildcat strikes among assembly-line workers, the elevation of "working conditions" to top priority in the UAW contract stance as a result of the expression of grass-roots grievances: these phenomena, as well as the observations of some objective "industrial relations" students, point to widespread and deep-seated alienation from the work process *as it is presently carried on*. On the other hand, many workers not chained to the assembly line seem to have considerable pride of craft despite their lack of overall power in the plant. In both cases, though, the Protestant ethic is overbearing. Whether or not a specific job is rewarding, work generally is considered necessary, and necessity has a way of being translated culturally into "enjoyment." Another unknown is the extent to which the prospect of truly free time in which to develop one's faculties and indulge one's better impulses is so empty and frightening to workers that the older style of work—and moonlighting—is preferred. This is quite an indictment of capitalism, but the "escape from freedom," whatever its exact extent, cannot simply be wished away.

As for the permanently unemployed and the poor, it may be that the Crowleys are right (MR, November 1964, p. 437) when they say that these left-outs, as they accustom themselves to continuing joblessness, are coming not to *want* to work any more; but I do not think their point is entirely established. On the North Side of Chicago, to take one instance with which I have some familiarity, the unemployed *do* want to work. (Whether they would still want to work if their income were guaranteed is another question, and a good one.) Unemployed members of the Committee for Jobs or Income Now (a group begun there by Students for a Democratic Society and the United Packinghouse Workers) show more interest in the "jobs" than in the "income" part of its program. Among unemployed East Kentucky miners in the Appalachian Committee for Full Employment, there is a painful ambivalence between the ills and injuries contracted in the mines and the desire to get back underground: much like the contrast between "Dark as the Dungeon" and "I don't want your millions, mister . . . Give me back my job again" in the 1930's. Again, there is no telling what the reaction of these people would be to a guarantee of a

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decent income. One reason public assistance is so despised by many of the unemployed today is that public agency controls over the expenditure of welfare allotments tend to be downright totalitarian; the allotments are horribly inadequate; the recipients are treated like dirt.

(3) This leads directly to the question of the radical's view of traditional work. The Crowleys "assume the beneficence of freedom from toil" (p. 424). Sweezy and Huberman incline toward the view that public ownership of productive facilities lends satisfaction and worth to traditional work (p. 420). My sympathies are with the Crowleys; it seems to me that the bulk of industrial work is inherently stultifying, whatever its uses—which is emphatically not to say that democratic control of economic decisions is not urgently desirable. The point is that the problems of public ownership and of the way people spend their time are not the same; nothing Huberman and Sweezy say about the state of affairs under public ownership denies that blue-collar jobs are displaceable (and implicitly best so).

The Crowleys and Huberman and Sweezy seem to agree that men would best spend their time doing things for one another. Work in a cybernated era becomes more broadly construed—including "services," education, art, professional work, etc. I think most signers of "The Triple Revolution" would endorse this utopia, and rightly so. But broadly speaking, there are two sharply different alternatives for this projected society. In one, small closed elites continue to decide what is produced, what jobs are legitimate, what is taught in schools, what is written in newspapers, etc., and the rest of us pick up our income checks and spend our time shopping. Clearly the seeds of this development—something like the world of *Looking Backward*—are omnipresent. The other alternative makes all such decisions democratic ones—democratic in the real sense of the universal right of participation through accessible institutions at all levels of society, not in present political institutions "chosen" in undemocratic ways. In order to establish this second order of things, we—radicals, organizers—must create democracy at the grass-roots: catalyze movements of the dispossessed that come to see their own political efforts as productive and

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establish both a new pattern of political involvement and new vehicles for their participation.

There should be no doubt which alternative we prefer, but the word "new" cannot substitute for careful thinking about the shape of a new order. Neither can armchair theorizing substitute for involvement—immersion in the catalysis of movements, direct comprehension of the hopes, fears, and possibilities of the people whose lives we are talking about. There has been far too much arid and misdirected social diagnosis already.

The attempt to create new organizations of the poor and unemployed to make economic demands ranging from better housing to jobs and/or income also carries the advantage of experimentalism. Different programs can and should be designed according to the predilections of the people involved. One advantage of the jobs-or-income formulation is that in the event of success it allows the workers themselves to work out their own preferences: if they want to work (in the old sense), okay; if they don't, also okay. Such an outcome requires that cybernation be neither uniformly endorsed nor uniformly condemned, but rather implemented or checked according to the option of the democratic planning bodies that must come into being. This idea of options is crucial for any radical who understands the ambivalences of working-class attitudes and yet has a vision he wishes to bring into being.

(4) Implicit in the above is the view that what Myrdal calls the "underclass" and what the Crowleys call the "lumpen-proletariat" are the primary agency of democratic social change at this time. As Adam Walinsky argued in *The New Republic*, the undifferentiated middle class needs to maintain poverty below it to emphasize its own prowess. This is in large part true for organized labor as well. Which is not to say that elements of both strata, and eventually large sections, cannot be spun off as allies, and important ones, of the proposed movement of the poor, but rather that the initiative must come from the bottom. Moreover, a movement from below allows some of the questions raised above to work themselves out–politically, not by administered fiat. The implications of such a development for the prospects of a democratic economy and culture should not be underrated.

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(continued from inside front cover)

Africa's leading political thinkers. The list price will be $3.50, but MR readers can order the book now at the prepublication price of $2.25.

An AP dispatch from Rangoon, Burma, published in the *New York Times* of November 8th, reports that the University there, after being closed for a year because of student disorders, is reopening with a new socialist curriculum. "In place of Western textbooks," the dispatch continues, "are the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Also on the reading list are *Social Transformation of the National Economy of People's China,* and *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution.*" We are indeed honored to be in such distinguished company.

MR Press has in the works an important and timely book on South Vietnam: *South Vietnam Since Dien Bien Phu,* by Nguyen Kien, a Vietnamese historian now living in exile in Paris. The book was originally published in French in Paris in 1963 and was widely hailed as the most complete and authoritative work on its subject. For the English edition the author is adding material amounting to a quarter to a third of the total length bringing the story up to date as of late 1964. Publication date and prices will be announced soon.

One of us was present at New Haven last March when the May Second Movement, a student peace-action group, was formed; and we have followed its activities with the greatest interest ever since. The May Second Movement is forming chapters on many college and university campuses and is circulating for signature a declaration which states: "We, the undersigned, are young Americans of draft age. We are opposed to United States military intervention in the war in South Vietnam. United States participation in that war is for the suppression of the Vietnamese struggle for self-determination and national independence. We herewith state our refusal to fight against the people of Vietnam." Money, volunteer workers, and signers are all urgently needed. Make out checks to Richard M. Rhoads, Treasurer, and send along with all communications to The May Second Movement, Box 153, Village Station, New York, N. Y. 10014.

In this issue we print a letter criticizing Philip Reno's *The Ordeal of British Guiana* (special July-August issue of MR, also issued in book form) by Sir Jock Campbell, Chairman of Booker Brothers McConnell, largest business firm in BG, together with Mr. Reno's reply. Those who have not yet read the *Ordeal* may be motivated by this exchange to make good the omission. If so, we suggest buying the cloth bound edition at the special Xmas sale price. See the list price reductions on many books on pp. 496-497.

A reader recently wrote asking how he could make a bequest to MR which would not involve the magazine in any tax liability. Our lawyer advises us that the appropriate form is as follows: "I bequeath the sum of $..... to Monthly Review, Inc., a domestic corporation having its principal office at 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10014, said bequest to be paid without deducting therefrom any inheritance or transfer tax."

We record with sorrow the death of our old friend Nathan Greene in New York on October 30th. In the formative period of MR, when we often needed help and advice, we could always count on Nuddie's sympathy and wisdom. In recent years, his health progressively deteriorated and he had to withdraw more and more from all activities. In the 1930's he was an active and effective fighter for civil liberties and the rights of labor, especially as editor of the International Juridical Association Bulletin. He was co-author with Felix Frankfurter, later Supreme Court Justice, of the authoritative study, *The Labor Injunction.*

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